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I. INTRODUCTON
Discerning motive is a tricky business. Yet under federal labor law,
whether an act is lawful or unlawful often depends on employer motive. An
employer, for example, is free to fire the most active union supporter in his
plant, regardless of the effect that discharge will have on unionization, so long
as the discharge is not motivated by "antiunion animus."'
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I thank Dan
Coenen, Paul Kurtz, and Dan White for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this
Article.
1 Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988),
makes it an unfair labor practice fQr an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." The Supreme Court has interpreted § 8(a)(3) to
make a violation dependent upon the employer's motivation. American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965); Radio Officers' Union of the Commercial Telegraphers
v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 44 (1954); see Archibold Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1, 21 (1947); Walter E. Oberer, 7he
Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motives,
Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491, 506 (1967).
This wrongful employer purpose, Professor Oberer notes, is "more accurately
described in terms of motive rather than intent." Id. at 506. As Professor Weber further
explains, "[O]rdinarily, intentions are immediate objectives, such as the intent to steal,
whereas motives are more basic or underlying objectives, such as the motive to be
wealthy." Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to
Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REV. 495, 498 (1990). When an employer
discriminates against a union adherent, he does so to achieve the underlying goal of
encouraging or discouraging unionization and thus acts from a wrongful motive. Id.
Nonetheless, the terms "motive" and "intent" are used interchangeably by the National
Labor Relations Board and by the courts, and therefore will be used interchangeably in this
article. See Thomas G.S. Christensen & Andrea H. Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the
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A difficulty inherent in cases under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), as in other areas of employment law,2 is in determining why the
employer acted.3 Perhaps an even harder question, and one too frequently
overlooked, is what form of evidence the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) and any reviewing court properly may consider in
determining motive. More specifically, can the Board take into account an
employer's vigorous opposition to the union in deciding whether or not a
particular action was motivated by antiunion animus? Although common sense
suggests yes, several courts of appeals have said no, relying on section 8(c) of
the NLRA4 and on the First Amendment.5
Conmission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77
YALE L.. 1269, 1278 (1968); Weber, supra.
For a fuller discussion of the role of unlawful motive in unfair labor practice cases, see
infra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
2 The question of employer motive or intent frequently is critical in cases under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et. seq. (1988) (prohibiting
empl6yment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, or national origin); the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et. seq. (1988) (prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of age); § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)
(piohibiting discrimination on the basis of race); § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of non job-related handicap). Under
these statutes, an employer who intentionally discriminates against an employee on the basis
of the prohibited factor acts unlawfully, absent an affirmative defense. International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). If the action is based on a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, however, no violation occurs. Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); see 1 CHARLES SULLIVAN Er AL.,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION Ch. 5, 245-80 (2d ed. 1988). Thus, in determining
whether an employment action is unlawful, the Court, in these disparate treatment cases,
must determine the intent underlying the employment action, an inquiry similar to that in
§ 8(a)(3) cases. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Charles A.
Edwards, Direct Evidence of Discriminatory Intent and the Burden of Proof. An Analysis
and Critique, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1986); Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping
and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 521 n.220
(1990); Weber, supra note 1, at 498.
3 See, e.g., NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 431 (2d Cir. 1951),
remanded, 340 U.S. 474 (1950) ("Nothing is more difficult than to disentangle the motives
of another's conduct-motives frequently unknown even to the actor himself."); Cox, supra
note 1, at 21 (noting the difficulties that arise in identifying an unlawful motive, because
motive "is an elusive subject of inquiry").
4 See, e.g., Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1990); NLRB v.
Colvert Dairy Prod. Co., 317 F.2d 44 (10th Cir. 1963); Indiana Metal Prod. v. NLRB, 202
F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953).
Section 8(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988), states as follows:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence
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Both section 8(c) and the First Amendment protect an employer's right to
campaign against the union.6 While coercive speech and conduct by an
employer are prohibited by the NLRA, 7 the expression of noncoercive views,
arguments, and opinions for and against unionization cannot be held unlawful.8
Section 8(c), moreover, provides that such protected speech shall not be
evidence of an unfair labor practice. 9 Relying on section 8(c), which has been
interpreted as "merely implementing" the First Amendment,10 some reviewing
courts have refused to allow the Board to consider an employer's antiunion
stance when assessing motivation.II This interpretation denies consideration of
what often may be probative evidence of employer motive. If section 8(c) does
preclude any use of protected speech as evidence of unlawful motive, it marks
of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Subchapter, if such
expression contains no threat or reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
As Professors Getman and Pogrebin have observed, a literal.reading'of § 8(c) results in
the exclusion of relevant evidence:
Employer speeches and statements are a measure of its opposition to unionism and
therefore an indication of its willingness to take action. The point becomes clearer if one
imagines two employers, one that conducted no campaign and the other that has
conducted a vigorous one. It is natural to assume that the employer that has not
conducted a campaign is less likely to have violated section 8(a)(3) than the one that
has. Suppose an employer characterizes union supporters as "incompetents and free
riders." Such a statement would be an expression of his right of free speech, but it also
would cast some possible light on his motive if a group of union supporters were
discharged shortly thereafter. The problem is that 8(c) announces a standard at odds
with common sense.
JuLIus GEmAN &BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS 66 (1988).
While this article agrees with Professors Getman and Pogrebin that employer speech is
relevant to the question of employer motive, it disagrees with their assumption that § 8(c)
mandates exclusion of this evidence. See infra notes 98-142 and accompanying text.
5 See cases cited supra note 4.
6 NLRB v. Gissel Packihg Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Virginia Elec.
& Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941). For a discussion of employers' First Amendment rights
under the NLRA, see infra notes 40-64 and accompanying text.
7 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988), makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the
exercise of their rights protected by the Act. Employer speech that constitutes either a threat
of reprisal or force or a promise of a benefit has been deemed coercive and thus an unfair
labor practice and also outside the protection of the First Amendment. NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405
(1964).
8 Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617; NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477
(1941). For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
9 29 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1988). The text of § 8(c) is set forth supra note 4.
10 Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617.
11 See cases cited supra note 4.
19921
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
for labor cases a significant change in the law of evidence, as what people say
frequently is used to determine why they acted. 12
Perhaps more important is the suggestion that it is not simply section 8(c)
but the First Amendment that requires exclusion of this evidence. The notion
that the First Amendment prohibits any reliance on "protected"' 3 employer
speech to establish unlawful conduct is a startling one, with implications for
other statutory claims, such as Title VII or the ADEA, with their similar focus
on employer motivation or intent. 14
This Article explores the extent to which protected employer speech under
the NLRA may be used to establish unlawful motivation. It does so in the
context of a particular category of unfair labor practice cases-those involving
the allegedly discriminatory discipline or discharge of union adherents. This
category of cases is not only the most common and critical one under the
Act,' 5 but it also presents questions of employer motive that are not unique to
the NLRA.16
An examination of the problem leads to two basic conclusions. First,
section 8(c) should not be construed to exclude evidence of protected speech. 17
An employer's antiunion position is relevant circumstantial evidence that
should be admissible before the Board in determining whether an employer's
12 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 1, at 19-20, noting that expressions of desire and opinion
"will often indicate the motive of otherwise ambiguous acts, and normal rules of evidence
permit proof of the actor's declarations to show his state of mind." Professor Cox criticizes
§ 8(c) for reversing the normal rules of evidence and thereby making proof of antiunion
conduct unduly difficult. Id.; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251
(1989), in which the Court noted that while stereotyped remarks do not inevitably prove sex
was a motivating factor in an employment decision, they are relevant evidence of an
employer's motive.
13 As used in this article, the term "protected speech" refers to speech that both § 8(c)
and the First Amendment protect from being held unlawful. That speech consists of views,
arguments and opinions that contain no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. See
Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617; 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988).
14 See the discussion supra note 2.
Whether use of speech as evidence in other statutory discrimination cases would ever
violate the First Amendment is beyond the scope of this article. As explained, infra notes
150-56 and accompanying text, whether the First Amendment requires exclusion of
evidence can be determined only by identifying whether the regulation is a direct or an
indirect abridgement of speech and then balancing the speech interests against the
governmental interests involved. While this article performs this analysis for discrimination
cases under the NLRA, it does not purport to do so for any other statutory claim.
Nonetheless, recognition of the need to engage in a First Amendment analysis in these
NLRA cases does suggest that First Amendment concerns may exist under other
discrimination statutes. See infra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
15 See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1778-81 (1983).
16 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 98-128 and accompanying text.
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actions were unlawfully motivated. Section 8(c), particularly in light of its
legislative history, may be construed simply to prohibit the Board from finding
a discharge unlawful when protected speech is the exclusive or primary
evidence of illegal motive.' 8 Second, this Article concludes that the First
Amendment poses no barrier to consideration of protected speech in an unfair
labor practice proceeding. 19 Rather, the First Amendment, like section 8(c),
prevents the Board only from relying exclusively or primarily on protected
speech to prove an employer's actions were unlawfully motivated.
The First Amendment limits on using protected speech as evidence of
unlawful motive is an issue that until now has not been fully explored. First
Amendment defenses by employers will grow, however, fueled by court
decisions excluding "protected speech" as evidence.20 -The statutory and
constitutional issues present in the evidentiary use of protected speech must
now be forthrightly confronted and resolved.
II. THE ROLE OF EMPLOYER MOTIVE UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
The NLRA grants employees the right to organize and to join unions, to
collectively bargain with their employers, and to engage in other concerted
activities for mutual aid or protection.21 It also declares certain actions by
18 See infra notes 129-42 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 143-78 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 1343 (1990).
Employers' use of the First Amendment as a shield in unfair labor practice cases is
perhaps but part of what Professor Balkin has described as "ideological drift-the means by
which the libertarian theory of the First Amendment increasingly is turned to serve
conservative social interests." J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J 375, 423. Professor Balkin notes that
the First Amendment concerns posed by racial or sexual harassment claims under Title VII
have not been confronted by the courts but suggests "any sum of money for harms caused
by speech surely raises First Amendment concerns." Id. at 422. He predicts an increasing
number of First Amendment defenses in employment discrimination cases in the future. Id.
at 421-23.
To date, however, using protected speech as evidence of unlawful motive or intent
appears not to have been raised under employment discrimination statutes other than the
NLRA. See Ellen E. Lange, Racist Speech on Campus: A 7tle VII Solution to a First
Amendment Problem, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 120 n.93 (1990) ("As of this writing, no
Title VII claims have been defended on First Amendment free speech grounds."); see also
Kingsley R. Browne, Ttle VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First
Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.. 481 (1991); Mary Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace,
25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1990) (analyzing the First Amendment issues involved in
regulating sexual harrassment).
21 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). These rights are collectively referred to as employees'
"Section 7" rights.
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employers or unions to be unfair labor practices, to be remedied by the
NLRB. 22
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights under the Act.23 A violation is not dependent upon a finding of
improper motive; actions concededly taken by an employer for legitimate
business reasons can be a violation of section 8(a)(1) if the interference with
employees' concerted activities outweighs the employer's business reasons for
its actions. 24
Section 8(a)(3) declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization." 25 This provision of the Act was designed to "insulate
employees' jobs from their organizational rights." 26 It makes clear that an
employer may not demote or fire an employee because of his union activities.
Whenever a union supporter is fired in the midst of an organizing
campaign, there necessarily will be an interference with or chilling of
employees' organizational rights, no matter the employer's motivation. 27 If the
22 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), (b) (1988).
Unfair labor practice are prosecuted by the NLRB's General Counsel and are tried
before an administrative law judge. The ALJ's recommended decision and order is
reviewed by the NLRB and is either accepted, rejected, or modified. The Board may enter
a cease and desist order, back-pay, and reinstatement when a worker is illegally discharged.
29 U.S.C. § 160(a)-(c) (1988).
The Board's orders are not self-enforcing, and the circuit courts of appeals have
authority to review Board orders, either on a petition by the Board to enforce the order or
on a petition by the losing party to set the order aside. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-() (1988). The
reviewing court must accept the Board's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole. 29 U.S.C. § 160(t) (1988).
23 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
24 Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). "It is only
when the interference with § 7 rights outweighs the business justification for the employer's
action that § 8(a)(1) is violated.... A violation of § 8(a)(1) alone therefore presupposes an
act which is unlawful even absent a discriminatory motive." Id. at 269; Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (employer's antisolicitation rule violates § 8(a)(1)
even though rule was adopted and enforced free from antiunion animus).
For a discussion of § 8(a)(1), see Christensen and Svanoe, supra note 1, at 1322-25.
The authors note that for most unfair labor cases, including those under section 8(a)(1),
motive is irrelevant. Id. at 1271.
25 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
26 Radio Officers' Union of the Commercial Telegraphers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40
(1954).
27 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965) (noting that
whenever a union leader is discharged, regardless of the employer's motive for the firing,
"[it is likely that the discharge will naturally tend to discourage union
membership. -.. because of the loss of union leadership and the employees' suspicion of the
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discharge were analyzed under section 8(a)(1), which requires no finding of
unlawful purpose or motive, the Board would simply balance the employer's
business reasons for the termination against the anticipated effect on concerted
activities. If the interference were deemed to outweigh the employer's reason
for the termination, an unfair labor practice would be found.28
Such employment actions, however, have not been analyzed under section
8(a)(1). 29 Instead, they have been considered under the more specific
provisions of section 8(a)(3), which has consistently been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to require a finding of unlawful, i.e., "antiunion," purpose. 30
In the seminal case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,31 the Court
found the NLRA did not interfere with the "normal exercise" of an employer's
right to hire and fire. Only if the "true purpose" for the action was to
employer's true intention."); see also A. Cox Er AL. CASES ON LABOR LAW 229 (1lth Ed.
1990) (pointing out that the discharge of an active union organizer will slow the momentum
of the organizing campaign, no matter what the employer's motive for the discharge was).
28 See COX et al., supra note 27, at 230.
29 Id.; see also Christensen and Svanoe, supra note 1, at 1322; Julius G. Getman,
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. CHI. L.
REV. 735 (1965).
A somewhat anomolous case is NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
There, an employee was fired because his employer mistakenly, but in good faith, believed
he had been engaged in picket line misconduct. The Court upheld the Board's finding that
§ 8(a)(1) was violated, resolving the case under that section rather than under § 8(a)(3). As
discussed by Professor Oberer, Burnup & Sims was resolved under § 8(a)(1) because the
discharge was not purported to further any legitimate employer interest. Thus, it was
unnecessary to use § 8(a)(3)'s motive analysis, which is protective of the employer's
managerial prerogatives, because the employer had put forward no business reason for the
discharge. Oberer, supra note 1, at 509-10.
30 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965);
American Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965). No proof of antiunion animus is
needed, however, if the discriminatory conduct is "inherently destructive" of employee
rights. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); see NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Co., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (grant of "super-seniority" to strike replacements "inherently
destructive" of employee rights).
For a general discussion and critique of the Court's focus on employer motive, see
Christensen and Svanoe, supra note 1. The authors criticize the Court for using motive as
the ostensibly controlling element for a § 8(a)(3) violation, a focus that "separates 8(a)(3)
from other violations." Id. at 1315. This focus on employer motive, say the authors, makes
the NLRA look like a "thought control" statute. Id. at 1326-27. They advocate a focus on
the injury to the employee, rather than on the motivation of the employer. See also Charles
C. Jackson & Jeffrey S. Heller, The Irrelevance of the Wright Line Debate: Returning to
the Realism of Erie Resistor in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 737
(1983), who suggest using a balancing process in individual discrimination cases under
§ 8(a)(3) and who contend a "bad" motive should not make a discharge unlawful if the
employer's business reasons outweigh the employee's rights.
31 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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intimidate or to coerce employees would an unfair labor practice occur.32
Subsequently, in Radio Officers' Union of the Commercial Telegraphers v.
NLRB, the Court stated "that Congress intended the employer's purpose in
discriminating to be controlling is clear." 33 Only if an employer acts out of
antiunion animus will a violation of section 8(a)(3) be found. This
interpretation protects the employer's managerial prerogatives. The employer
may make employment decisions for good reasons or for foolish ones; it simply
may not take action against an employee because of antiunion animus.34
It has been estimated that up to 10,000 employees a year are fired because
of their involvement in union campaigns. 35 Not surprisingly, charges of
discriminatory conduct based on union activities are the most common charges
filed with the NLRB. 36 In each contested case, the Board must determine what
motive or motives caused the employer to take the disciplinary action at issue,
because whether the discipline was lawful depends on the employer's intent.37
32 Id. at 45-46. For a discussion of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., see Christensen &
Svanoe, supra note 1, at 1275.
33 347 U.S. 17, 44 (1954).
34 See NLRB v. C.J.R. Transfer Inc., 936 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1991); NLRB v.
McGahey, 233 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1956); Oberer, supra note 1, at 516 ("The purpose of the
hostile-motive requirement is two-fold: (1) to protect the employer's prerogative 'to select,
discharge, lay-off, transfer, promote or demote his employees for any reasons other than
those proscribed by the Act); (2) to keep the Board's thumb off the bargaining scales in
order to preserve free collective bargaining."); see also Getman, supra note 29, at 735
(viewing § 8(a)(3)'s motive requirement as a compromise between the employee's § 7 rights
and the employer's interest in running his business).
As Professor Getman points out, it sometimes is difficult to distinguish a "valid"
business reason from antiunion animus. For example, when an employer takes action, such
as closing down part of his business, because of the increased costs a union will bring, some
courts have regarded that reason as a "legitimate one" and not an antiunion one. See NLRB
v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961); NLRB v.
Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955). Professor Getman recognizes that these
cases were wrongly decided because antiunion animus generally is based on economic
considerations, and thus economically-based animus cannot be disregarded. Getman, supra
note 29, at 738-39, 743; see NLRB v. C.R. Transfer, 936 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1991).
But as Professor Getman also notes, "[tihe typical 8(a)(3) case involves the discharge
or discipline of an employee active in union activities. The employer defends on the
grounds that the discharge was not based on union activity, but on poor work or
misconduct." Id. at 743. In these cases, he says, focus on motive is appropriate because it
preserves the employer's right to run his business.
35 Weiler, supra note 15, at 1780-81 n.35, further estimates that the odds are 1 in 20
that a union supporter will be fired for exercising his § 7 rights.
36 Id. at 1780.
37 See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
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In making this determination, the Board, in the usual case, necessarily must
rely on circumstantial evidence. 38 Such facts as the employer's awareness of
the employee's union activities, the strength of the employer's asserted reason
for the discharge, the employer's treatment of similar infractions, and the
employer's "degree of opposition" to the union, all have routinely been
considered by the Board in determining whether a particular disciplinary action
was taken because of the employee's protected activity or for some other, and
accordingly lawful, reason. 39
The question examined here is whether the Board errs when it considers
the employer's degree of opposition to the union in determining whether a
violation of section 8(a)(3) has occurred. This issue must be confronted when
the opposition is expressed through "protected" speech.
IMI. PROTECTED EMPLOYER SPEECH UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
Employers have free speech rights the National Labor Relations Act cannot
abridge. Although this may seem self-evident today, the Board originally took
the opposite view. In its early administration of the Wagner Act, the Board
determined that an employer was not entitled to express his views on
unionization and had to remain neutral to avoid committing an unfair labor
practice. 40 This approach is not without considerable policy support. Any
communications by an employer, for or against the union, may influence
workers to vote in a manner inconsistent with their actual beliefs. 41 Thus,
38 See NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refinery Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 670 (1st Cir.
1979) ("On rare occasions an employer may even admit to unlawful motivation... but the
usual case of independent proof is by showing other acts apart from the discharge that
indicate unlawful anti-union animus."); see also Weiler, supra note 15, at 1802, noting that
the legality of a discharge is "always open" to dispute and requires "delicate inference from
a mosaic of circumstantial evidence."
39 Weiler, supra note 15, at 1802. Professor Weiler describes the Board's reliance on
the employer's opposition to the union without mentioning § 8(c); see also Turnbull Cone
Baking Co. v. NLRB, 778 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986)
(describing a similar list of factors to be considered in determining whether animus
motivated an employer).
40 See In re Southern Colo. Power Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 699 (1939), enfd, 111 F.2d 539
(10th Cir. 1940); In re Hlilgartner Marble Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 1200 (1939); see also Maurice
Shams, Employer Free Speech in Union Organizing Campaigns, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 231
(1962-63) (hereinafter Employer Free Speech); Note, Labor Law Reforn The Regulation
of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
755, 757 (1979) (hereinafter Labor Law Reform).
41 Southern Colo. Power Co., 13 N.L.R.B. at 711; see Cox et al., supra note 27, at
143 ("Any argument which discloses the speaker's strong wishes is not wholly an appeal to
reason if the listener is in the speaker's power. In a southern mill town where a textile
concern is the only large employer and its owners dominate the whole community, even a
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mandating employer silence helps ensure that election results actually reflect
employee desires. Moreover, the decision of whether or not to be represented
by a union is a matter for employee determination; the employer has no vote.
In NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Company,42 however, the Supreme
Court rejected the "strict neutrality" doctrine. The employer in Virginia
Electric had waged an aggressive antiunion campaign, and it contended the
Board had found the campaign to be an unfair labor practice.43 It further
claimed the Board's position was at odds with the First Amendment. 44 The
Supreme Court held the NLRA did not preclude an employer from taking a
position on unionization; noncoercive speech could not be deemed an unfair
labor practice.45 While the Court did not directly address the First Amendment
claim, "the importance of the Court's decision was clear: 'Yes, Virginia,' there
is a freedom of speech which extends to employers."46
The Court itself later expressly acknowledged what Virginia Electric
implied: noncoercive employer speech is entitled to First Amendment
protection. 47 Informed discussion concerning labor relations was recognized as
necessary for "effective and intelligent" self-government. 48 "Accordingly, [the]
decision here has recognized that employers' attempts to persuade to action
with respect to joining or not joining unions are within the First Amendment's
guaranty." 49
If the employer speech is coercive, however, there is no constitutional
barrier to prohibiting it.50 In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc.,5 x the Court
dispassionate expression of the company's opinion will make the ordinary employee think
twice about openly supporting a labor union distasteful to the employer."); Robert F.
Koretz, Employer Interference with Union Organization Versus Employer Free Speech, 29
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 399, 401 (1960-61) (the strict neutrality doctrine was based on
employer's superior economic power that employees would be afraid to thwart).
42 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
43 Id. at 470-75.
44Id. at 477.45 Id.
46 Thomas G.S. Christensen, Free Speech, Propaganda and the National Labor
Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 243, 256 (1963).
Virginia Electric has been viewed as establishing three essential principles: (1) An
employer has the right to express his views on labor policy; (2) the Board is required to
look at the employer's total conduct in determining whether speech is coercive; and (3) the
Board can consider speech in determining whether conduct was coercive. Note, Labor Law
Reform, supra note 40, at 759. For further discussion of this latter point, see infra notes
161-78 and accompanying text.
47 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945).
48 Id. at 532; see also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940).
49 Thomas, 323 U.S. at 537 (citing Virginia Electric).
50 Coercive speech generally has been considered outside the First Amendment's
protection. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 537; see Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign
Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L.
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attempted to draw the line between coercive speech, which is without First
Amendment protection, and noncoercive speech, which may not be restrained
by the Board. Recognizing employees' economic dependence on their
employers, the Court was willing to find only a narrow category of employer
speech entitled to First Amendment protection. As the Court stated, "an
employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views
about unionism or any of his specific views about a particular union, so long as
the communications do not contain a 'threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.'" 52 The Court went on to distinguish threats from predictions,
requiring that any predictions be based on objective facts regarding
consequences beyond the employer's control. 53
Distinguishing protected from unprotected employer speech has not been
easy. Because "coercive" speech is unprotected by the First Amendment and
unlawful under section 8(a)(1), the Board and reviewing courts must determine
whether employer statements are merely communications about unionization or
whether instead they are unlawful threats or promises. 54 Various commentators
have criticized the Court's willingness to restrict labor speech and have urged
REV. 38, 69 (1964) (recognizing coercive employer speech "hardly contributes to the
exchange of views that the Constitution seeks to promote").
51 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
52 Id. at 618.
53
Mhe prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an
employer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control or to
convey a management decision already arrived at to close the plant in case of
unionization. If there is any implication that an employer may or may not take action
solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities and known
only to him, the statement is no longer a reasonable prediction based on available facts
but a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion, and as such without
the protection of the First Amendment.
Id. (citation omitted).
These restrictions on employer speech were justified by the Court on the basis of
employees' economic dependence on their employers. Id. at 617. As Professor Getman has
observed, the Court has been unwilling in areas outside the labor context to apply such a
liberal definition of "coerciveness" to speech. Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech:
The Curious Policy ofLi'red Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4, 10 (1984).
54 Compare NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1983) with NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
Historically, the Board has tended to view employer speech more restrictively than
have the reviewing courts. Employer statements regarding potential economic or other
"serious harms" from unionization, for example, have frequently been found unlawful by
the Board but protected by the courts. For a thorough discussion of this point and for a
collection of relevant cases, see Beth Z. Margulies, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.: A
Standard Without a Following (The Need for Reappraisal of Employer Free Speech Rights in
the Organizing Campaign), 22 WnLAMETE L. REV. 459 (1986).
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broader First Amendment protection.5 5 Recently, the Court put forward the
"tantalizing" 56 suggestion that perhaps labor speech is entitled to greater
protection than previously believed.5 7 But whatever future expansions may
occur, it presently is clear that at least noncoercive employer speech is entitled
to First Amendment protection.
It is not only the First Amendment but section 8(c) of the NLRA that
protects such speech. Under section 8(c), "[t]he expressing of any views,
argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed,
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under any of the provisions of [the Act], if such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."58 Section 8(c) has been
regarded as merely restating constitutional protections. 59 As the Court observed
in Gissel, section 8(c) "merely implements the First Amendment." 60 The Court
in Gissel used the "threats and promises" language of section 8(c) to establish
the parameters of protected speech for First Amendment purposes. 61
Accordingly, in determining whether or not particular employer speech is or is
not coercive and a violation of section 8(a)(1), the inquiries under section 8(c)
and the First Amendment have been coextensive. 62
While the Board and courts have found that section 8(c) "merely
implements" the First Amendment for purposes of determining whether speech
55 See Getman, supra note 53; Margulies, supra note 54; James G. Pope, The Three-
Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values: Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 189 (1984); Sylvia G. Eaves, Note, Employer Free Speech During
Representation Elections, 35 S.C. L. REV. 617 (1983-84); see also Bok, supra note 50, at
68 (equating union election campaigns with political contests and suggesting that union
election results may be of more importance to employees' lives than the results of many
political elections).56 Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our
First Amenbnent Discourse and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 149, 173.
57 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1988). Heightened First Amendment protection for labor speech
could mean that Gissel's willingness to view employer speech as coercive would be suspect,
thereby expanding the type of employer speech that would be deemed noncoercive and
entitled to First Amendment protection. See Kohler, supra note 56, at 199.
58 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988).
59 See Christensen, supra note 46, at 265 ("To the extent that a consensus has been
reached, it is in favor of regarding section 8(c) as a restatement of the constitutional
guarantee."); see also James W. Wimberly, Jr., & Martin H. Steckel, NLRB CaQpaign
Laboratory Conditions Doctrine and Free Speech Revisited, 32 MERCER L. REV. 535, 547
(1981).
60 395 U.S. at 617 (1969).
61 Id.
62 Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1983); Dow Chem.
Co., Texas Div. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1981); see Margulies, supra note 54, at
468, 496-500.
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is coercive, 63 there has been little attention paid to the question of whether
section 8(c)'s prohibition on the use of noncoercive speech as evidence of an
unfair labor practice also "merely implements" First Amendment protections.
Those courts addressing the issue have appeared to assume it does. 64 These
decisions raise fundamental issues concerning the extent to which evidentiary
use of protected speech is prohibited by section 8(c) and whether those
prohibitions are mandated by the First Amendment.
IV. SECRON 8(C) OF THE NLRA
Section 8(c) was part of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA that on
the whole were designed to counterbalance the Wagner Act's prounion
stance.65 Taft-Hartley, for example, added to the protections of section 7 the
right to refrain from engaging in concerted activities. 66 It also added a list of
unfair union labor practices. 67 Most important for present purposes, it added
section 8(c), which affirmatively protects employer speech. 68
As set forth above, the Board had interpreted the Wagner Act to require
neutrality on the part of employers. 69 Although the Supreme Court in Virginia
Electric disagreed with the Board's interpretation and confirmed an employer's
63 See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
64 See, e.g., Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1990); NLRB v.
General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 774 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, I., concurring and
dissenting), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970); NLRB v. Colvert Dairy Prods. Co., 317
F.2d 44 (10th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 271 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1959).
65 The National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(1936), recognized and protected employees' rights to organize and to bargain collectively
with their employers. It was amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1948). For discussion of the Taft-Hartley
amendments, see HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT
TO TAFF-HARTLEY (1950); G. VAN ARKLE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT (1947); Cox, supra note 1; John A. Perkins, Basic Labor Issues Under the
Taft-Harley Act, 27 B.U. L. REV. 371 (1947).
66 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). Prior to Taft-Hartley, the NLRA only protected the right
to organize and to bargain; the Taft-Hartley amendments, by guaranteeing the right to
refrain from such activities, moved the government from actively encouraging unionization
to a position of neutrality. See A. COX et al., supra note 27, at 195.
67 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1988). Under the Wagner Act, only employers' unfair labor
practices were outlawed. The perceived need to limit union power resulted in § 8(b), which
prohibits various union activities, such as secondary boycotts, refusals to bargain, and
strikes to compel an employer to commit an unfair labor practice.
68 Section 8(c) frequently has been referred to as the "employer free speech" provision
of the NLRA. See, e.g., Norman F. Burke, Employer Free Speech, 26 FORDHAM L. REV.
266 (1957).
69 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
19921
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
right to speak out against unions, the Board had responded to Virginia Electric
by giving only grudging respect to employers' free speech rights.70
Both the House and Senate were in agreement on the need for language
protecting employer "free speech." 71 But there was disagreement on the scope
of protection that should be provided. 72 After extensive debate, the final
version of section 8(c) contained language, originating in the House, that
provided that noncoercive speech not only would not constitute but could not
be evidence of an unfair labor practice. 73
70 After Virginia Electric, for example, the Board had found it unlawful for an
employer to address its employees during working time, making these so-called "captive
audience" speeches an unfhir labor practice. See Clark Bros., 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946),
enfd in part, 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947). As one court observed, it was Virginia Electric
and "the Board's halting response to it" that gave rise to § 8(c). NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388
F.2d 921, 926 (2d Cir. 1967).
71 Versions of § 8(c) were passed by both houses. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 8(d)(1) (1947); S. 1126, 80th Cong., lst Sess., § 8(c) (1947).
The legislative history of both versions reflects a desire to secure employer free
speech. See, e.g., H.R. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr 1947, at 324
(1985); 93 CONG. REC. § 3834 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1947) (statement of Sen. Taft); see also
Wimberly & Steckel, supra note 59, at 547, and infra notes 124-25, 135-36 and
accompanying text.
Section 8(c) assures not only employers but unions their free speech rights. A
discussion of union free speech, however, is outside the scope of this article. For a
discussion of union free speech rights, see Getman, supra note 53; Kohler, supra note 56;
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The Persisting Problem of
Picketing, 16 SUFFoLKU. L. REV. 883 (1982).
72 Much of the debate centered on the extent to which surrounding circumstances
could be considered in determining whether facially benign speech was coercive. The
House bill protected all speech that "by its own express terms" did not contain a threat.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(d)(1) (1947). The Senate, in contrast, protected
speech that "under all the circumstances" contained no threat. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 8(c) (1947). The final version of § 8(c) eliminated both the "by its own express
terms" and "under all the circumstances" language, leaving open the extent to which
context may be used to give meaning to words. The Supreme Court in Gissel, however,
read § 8(c) as permitting the Board to consider context in determining whether speech is
coercive. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
For discussion of the background of § 8(c), see NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921
(2d Cir. 1967); Robert J. Berghel & David L Dempsey, Section 8(c) of the NLRA" Giving It
Meaning, 32 MERcER L. REv. 575 (1981); Frank Elkouri, Employer Free Speech, 4 LAB.
L.. 78 (1953); Koretz, supra note 41; Wimberly & Steckel, supra note 59; Note, Free
Speech and Free Ctwice in Representation Elections: Effect of Taft-Hartley Act Section 8(c),
58 YALE L.J 165 (1948). Much of this writing focuses on the extent to which § 8(c) does
or should permit consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" in determining whether
speech is coercive.
73 For discussion of the legislative history on this portion of the statute, see infra notes
108-25 and accompanying text.
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Academic reaction to this aspect of section 8(c) was to read it literally and
to chafe at its restrictions. 74 Professor Cox, for example, assumed that section
8(c) would prevent the Board from considering an employer's opposition to the
union in deciding whether the discharge of a union supporter was for the
purpose of discouraging unionization. 75 He criticized this result, observing that
it would make protecting organizational rights too difficult. 76 Similarly,
Professor Van Arkle said section 8(c) "seems clear on its face that 'views,
arguments or opinions' are not to be received as evidence in labor Board
cases," and specifically noted such expression could not be used to determine
the motive underlying a discharge, although he, too, criticized the provision as
"absurd."77
The Board also originally accepted this reading of section 8(c). In its 1948
Annual Report, the NLRB noted that prior to section 8(c), "noncoercive
antiunion remarks of an employer, although themselves privileged, were
admissible to show an employer's motive where that fact was in issue. In view
of the language of section 8(c), however, the Board found in several cases that
privileged expressions of opinion were not admissible to show motive."78
It was not long before the Board altered its approach to section 8(c). 79 No
longer would noncoercive, antiunion statements, such as leaflets and/or
74 GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 4, at 66; VAN ARKLE, supra note 65, at 23-26;
Cox, supra note 1, at 19-21; Elkouri, supra note 72, at 81-84; Note, supra note 72, at
170-76.
75 Cox, supra note 1, at 19.
76 Id. at 45.
77 VAN ARKLE, supra note 65, at 25-26; see also Note, supra note 72, at 176, where
the author, accepting that § 8(c) precludes any consideration of noncoercive speech, found
that § 8(c), "by placing blinders upon the Board, has hindered its effectiveness in translating
the guarantee of uncoerced elections into reality."
78 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 50 (1948).
While the Board and commentators too readily conceded that § 8(c) precludes any use
of protected speech as evidence of an unfair labor practice, they each recognized this
restriction to be beyond the protections afforded by the First Amendment. They did so,
however, without benefit of explanation. See VAN ARKLE, supra note 65, at 26 ("clearly,
this protection is much wider than the constitutional guarantee of free speech); Elkouri,
supra note 72, at 79 (Section 8(c) "grants immunity beyond that accorded by the First
Amendment"); Note, supra note 72, at 170 n.22 ("the Section appears to restrict a use
against which there is no constitutional inhibition."); 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 49 (1948)
(Section 8(c) "appears... to grant immunity beyond that contemplated by the free speech
guarantees of the [First Amendment]").
79 See Edwards Bros., Inc., 95 N.L.R.B. 1451 (1951); Southern Desk Co., 116
N.L.R.B. 1168 (1956), enforced, 246 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1957); Smith's Transfer Corp., 162
N.L.R.B. 143 (1966); Sun Hardware Co., Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 973 (1968), enforced, 422
F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1970); General Battery Corp., 241 N.L.R.B. 1166 (1979); Active
Transport, 296 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (1989), enforced, 1991 U.S. App. Lexis 1603 (6th Cir.
1991); Mark Industries, Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1989).
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campaign speeches urging employees to "vote no," be excluded from the
record when an employer was charged with discrimination. Rather, the Board
began using such statements, in its words, not as "evidence" of an unfair labor
practice but as "background" from which motive could be determined.80 Of
course, such semantics cannot disguise what is happening: the Board is using
antiunion speech as evidence to determine whether or not the employer acted
for an unlawful purpose. 81 It does so because of the difficulties inherent in
determining motive and because an employer's antiunion statements are
probative in determining whether a discharge was motivated by antiunion
animus*82
The Board's formal position has been consistent over the last 40 years. 83
Under the Board's approach, evidence of antiunion animus continues to be
considered as circumstantial, "background" evidence to determine whether an
employer acted for an unlawful purpose. But antiunion animus is to be used
only as part of the overall picture and not as the exclusive proof of a section
8(a)(3) violation84
For the most part, the reviewing courts have accepted the Board's position,
perhaps because it is so firmly grounded in common sense. Using protected
statements or speeches to place acts in context or to draw the background of a
controversy has been approved, often with recognition of the difficulty of
ascertaining motive.85 The courts, however, have provided little serious
80 See, e.g., Smith's Transfer Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 143, 161 (1966) ("The General
Counsel argues that he has not charged that the wording of the leaflets or their dissemination
constitute either an unfair labor practice or evidence on which was predicated the
commission of an unfair labor practice, but that the statements do provide a background
from which another action, alleged to have been an unfair labor practice discharge, may be
shown or inferred to have had an anti-union motive. The leaflets were offered and received
in evidence for that purpose.").
81 See GErMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 4, at 66, charging that the Board's
consideration of the speech as "background" "merely masks the inconsistency with Section
8(c)," but explaining the Board's approach as an understandable response to what the
authors regard as the strictures of § 8(c).82 See, e.g., Smith's Transfer Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 143, 164 (1966) ("Examination of
the total circumstances, including speech, is therefore essential to fair judgment of motive,
and Section 8(c) presents no bar to such examination.").
83 See cases cited supra note 79; GErMAN & POGPREBIN, supra note 4, at 65-66.
84 Id. On occasion, however, the reviewing courts have accused the Board of straying
from this standard and of basing a finding of antiunion animus solely on the employer's
protected speech. See, e.g., NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666
(1st Cir. 1979); Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1979). In these cases,
the courts have refused to enforce the Board's order. For detailed discussion of this point,
see infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
85 See NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
989 (1982); Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert.
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analysis of section 8(c). Rather, they have offered conclusory assertions that
section 8(c) was not intended to require exclusion of this "background"
evidence.8 6 In other cases, courts have found antiunion bias "highly
significant" without any discussion of section 8(c) at all. 87
But the reviewing courts have not been unanimous. In NLRB v. Colvert
Dairy Products Co., 88 for example, the Tenth Circuit rejected the Board's use
of protected speech as "background evidence" to establish an unfair labor
practice. In language that implies a strong First Amendment concern, the court
stated:
To allow the privileged communications to become an instrument of
destruction by indirection is to frustrate the right of free speech and the
privilege of persuasion. Management cannot effectively attempt lawful
persuasion if by so doing there is an ever-present penalty of "anti-union
animus" for inherent in every campaign that is strenuously but lawfully waged
is the expressed resistance to the views and claims of the opponent.... The
right of management to freely express its views in opposition to unionization
cannot be burdened by indirection and thus destroyed through technical
rationalization. 89
More recently, the Second Circuit reiterated this rationale. In Holo-Krome
Co. v. NLRB, 90 the court refused enforcement of a Board order that found two
workers had not been hired because of their union activities. The court rejected
the Board's determination because the Board had used the employer's lawful
antiunion campaign as background evidence of unlawful motive. 91
In faulting the Board for permitting the introduction of this evidence, the
court noted an employer's "free speech" rights to express his views on
unionization cannot be infringed by the Board.92 The court pointed to Gissel's
denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969); NLRB v. Lipman Bros., Inc., 355 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1966);
Angwell Curtain Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1951).
86 See NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970); Sonoco Prods. Co., 399 F.2d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 1968);
Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 760, 769 (4th Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1023 (1969); International Union v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 702, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966); Hendrix Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 100, 103-04 (5th
Cir. 1963).
87 See Microimage Display Div. of Xidex Corp. v. NLRB, 924 F.2d 245, 251 n.3
(D.C. Cir. 1991); Chromalloy Mining & Minerals, Alaska Div., Chromalloy Am. Corp. v.
NLRB, 620 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Louisiana Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 696 (8th
Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Lipman Bros., Inc., 355 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1966).
88 317 F.2d 44 (10th Cir. 1963).
89 Id. at 46-47.
90 907 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1990).
91 Id. at 1347.
92 Id. at 1345.
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statement that section 8(c) "implements" the First Amendment, although it
recognized the Supreme Court has yet to construe section 8(c)'s requirement
that noncoercive speech not be used as evidence of an unfair labor practice.93
The court went on to examine section 8(c) and concluded it bars any
reliance on protected speech to support a finding of unlawful motive. 94
Pointing to the legislative history of the section, it found a clear congressional
intent to exclude any use of protected speech. 95 As the court stated, "[i]n
striking the balance between protecting employees from coercion and
permitting all opinions regarding labor disputes to be presented, Congress
chose to prevent chilling lawful employer speech by preventing the Board from
using antiunion statements, not independently prohibited by the Act, as
evidence of unlawful motivation." 96 In remanding the case, the court directed
the Board to reconsider the evidence without regard to Holo-Krome's protected
statements. 97
This Second Circuit decision is the most detailed judicial analysis of
section 8(c)'s prohibition on the use of protected speech as evidence of an
unfair labor practice. That it rejects any use of these statements as evidence is
likely to trigger more frequent and vigorous employer attacks on the Board's
approach. Moreover, because its construction of section 8(c) appears guided by
constitutional concerns, it presents the question of whether using noncoercive
speech as evidence of an unfair labor practice would violate the First
Amendment.
A. The Proper Role of the Courts in Interpreting Section 8(c)
The Second Circuit read section 8(c) as follows: the expressing of
noncoercive views, argument, or opinion shall not be introduced as evidence,
whether background or primary, that an employer acted with wrongful
93 Id., cting NLRB v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U.S. 498, 501 (1951), in which
the Supreme Court stated it was "express[ing] no opinion on the possible effect of § 8(c). of
the Taft-Hartley Act." (citation omitted).
94 907 F.2d at 1346-47.
9 5 Id. As the court noted, the House, but not the Senate, version of § 8(c) contained the
"be evidence of" language. That the compromise version contained the language was
viewed by the court as persuasive that protected speech was inadmissible as evidence of
unlawful motive. Moreover, the court pointed to criticisms of the language voiced in the
House Minority Report and in President Truman's veto, criticisms that read § 8(c) as
precluding any use of protected speech.
For further discussion of § 8(c)'s legislative history and a critique of the Holo-Kronw
view, see infra notes 95-142 and accompanying text.
96 907 F.2d at 1347.
97 Id. On remand, the Board reaffirmed its finding that § 8(a)(3) violations had been
committed but did so without regard to the protected speech. Holo-Krome, 302 N.L.R.B.
No. 71 (1991); see infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
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motive.98 This holding is wrong. Courts that have rejected the agency's
interpretation and read section 8(c) to preclude any consideration of protected
speech have overstepped the limits of judicial authority.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.99
establishes a two-step process for review of an agency's interpretation of its
enabling statute. Under step one, the court must determine whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise issue with a clear intent.100 The reviewing
court is free to use "the traditional tools of statutory construction," including
resort to legislative history, to determine whether a clear and unambiguous
congressional intent is present.101 If there is, the matter is at an end; the clear
and unambiguous congressional intent controls.102 But if there is no clear and
unambiguous intent, the court cannot independently interpret the statute but
must accept the agency's view, so long as the agency's reading is based on a
permissible construction of the statute. 103
The Second Circuit's position is that section 8(c) clearly and
unambiguously precludes any evidentiary use of protected speech in unfair
labor practice proceedings. As set forth below, there is no such clear and
unambiguous congressional intent.
First, although the Supreme Court has yet to confront the issue discussed
herein, it has rejected a "literal" reading of section 8(c). In International
98 See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text. The second circuit is not the only
court to interpret the statute in this fashion; it simply is the most recent. See cases cited
supra note 4.
99 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
100 Id. at 842-43. For discussion of the Chevron "two-step" approach, see, e.g.,
Richard 1. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftennath: Judicial Review ofAgency Interpretations
of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988); Kenneth W. Starr et al., Judicial
Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353 (1987);
Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Linmited Resources for Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093
(1987).
101 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. That resort to legislative history is
proper at step one of the Chevron analysis is demonstrated by Chevron itself. Id. at 845; see
also American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S.Ct. 1539 (1991); NLRB v. United Food &
Comm' Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 124-25 (1987). But see Public Employees
Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 172 (1989) ("In view of our interpretation of the
plain statutory language of the subterfuge requirement .... reliance on legislative history is
misplaced"); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DuKE L. J. 511, 521 (discussing his own preference for a "plain meaning" approach
to statutory construction that avoids consideration of legislative history).102 Oevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43.
103 "If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute." Id. at 843.
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Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 1°4 the Court found section 8(c)
did not immunize peaceful speech or picketing in furtherance of an unfair labor
practice, ruling that the general speech protections of section 8(c) must give
way to the more specific provisions of section 8(b)(4), which outlaws
secondary boycotts. Thus, when speech is an integral component of the unfair
labor practice, section 8(c) does not bar its use as evidence, notwithstanding the
literal wording of the statute. 105
Second, the Court's decision in IBEW v. NLRB not only recognizes section
8(c) is not to be read literally, but also acknowledges it should be read in
harmony with other sections of the Act. Accordingly, a construction of section
8(c) at odds with the statute's goal of protecting employees from discrimination
is suspect. 106
Third, the legislative history does not reveal a clear congressional intent
that section 8(c) be read literally. 10 7 Unlike most questions of statutory
construction under the NLRA,lOs the construction of section 8(c) need not
proceed in the face of congressional silence. The extent to which section 8(c)
prohibits the use of "protected speech" as evidence of unlawful motive was
debated vigorously and demonstrates the absence of any clear congressional
intent to wholly exclude consideration of protected speech. 10 9
104 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
105 Id.; see Smith's Transfer Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 143, 162 (1966); Christensen,
supra note 46, at 265.
106 See K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) (looking to the design of
the statute as a whole to determine a term's meaning); see also The Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) ("It is a familiar rule that a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor
within the intention of its makers.").
107 That an examination of the legislative history of § 8(c) is necessary and appropriate
in determining whether it reflects a clear and unambiguous congressional intent has been
recognized by both the Board and the reviewing courts. See, e.g., Holo-Krome Co. v.
NLRB, 907 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1990); Smith's Transfer, 162 N.L.R.B. 143 (1966).
108 The NLRA is purposely broad and ambiguous in many respects. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S.Ct. 1542, 1549 (1990); Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
Jueicial Review ofAgency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 SUP. CT. REV.
53, 56-57 (1968); Rebecca H. White, ine for a New Approach: Why the Judidwy Should
Disregard the 'Law of the Crcit' When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National
Labor Relations Board, 69 N.C. L. REV. 639, 651-52 (1991).
109 See H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 71, at 324; H.R. Min. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 71, at 375-76; S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 71, at 114; H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 71, at 549; 93 CONG.
REC. H6385, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. June 4, 1947) (remarks of Rep. Madden); 93
CONG. REC. H6436, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. June 5, 1947) (Labor Management
Conference Report-remarks of Senator Taft; remarks of Senators Pepper and Morse); 93
CONG. REC. S4587, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. May 6, 1947) (remarks of Senator
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Section 8(c) was aimed at overturning the Board's restrictive approach to
employer speech under the Wagner Act. Not only had the Board originally
found the NLRA to require employer neutrality, after Virginia Electric it had
found unfair labor practices based on the time and place or surrounding
circumstances, as opposed to the content, of employer speech. 110 These Board
decisions were of particular concern to Congress in enacting section 8(c). 111
But the Board also had engaged in another practice that Congress was
intent on banning through section 8(c). In cases where a union supporter had
been fired after the employer had conducted an antiunion campaign, the Board
had found the employer speech to be conclusive evidence of unlawful
motivation. 112 As further discussion will show, section 8(c) is susceptible to a
reading that it is only these decisions Congress intended to address through the
"be evidence of" language of section 8(c). 113
Certainly, the contrary construction of section 8(c) employed in Holo-
Krome has support in the legislative history. Opponents of the language "shall
not.., be evidence of' read this language literally and argued it would require
Murray); 93 CONG. REC. S6858, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. June 12, 1947) (remarks
of Senator Taft).1 10 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
III See Elkouri, supra note 72, at 82 ("Legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
amendments indicates that § 8(c) was intended, among other things, to abolish all aspects of
the captive-audience doctrine . "..."); Koretz, supra note 41, at 403 ("[l]t is reasonably
clear that Congress was concerned mainly with revising two aspects of prior NLRB rulings:
(1) the 'compulsory audience' doctrine; (2) an alleged abuse of the 'course of conduct'
doctrine, that is, the tendency of the Board to hold that an employer's speech, in itself
privileged, was coercive merely because the employer had committed some severabl6 and
unrelated unfair labor practice."); Wimberly & Steckel, supra note 59, at 538-39 (§ 8(c)
"intended to alter NLRB misuse of the 'course of conduct' doctrine .... ").
112 See, e.g., Interlake Iron Corp. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1942); NLRB v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 129 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Riverside Mfg. Co.,
119 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1941); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. Clemons Branch, 35 N.L.R.B.
810 (1941); Luxuray, Inc., 16 N.L.R.B. 37 (1939), modfied, 123 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1941);
see also Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 1, at 1274 (Early on, "[piroof of an overall anti-
union animus was, in many instances, considered sufficient to demonstrate that the reason
(i.e., "motive") for a termination or demotion was union activity rather than some other,
independent cause for discipline.").
The extent to which the Board actually engaged in this practice is debatable. But
whether or not based in reality, the perception was that the Board routinely was basing
unfhir labor practice findings solely on employers' opposition to unionization. See Cox,
supra note 1, at 19 (recognizing this Board practice as a motivation for 8(c)); Theodore R.
Iserman, Free Speech and the N.L.R.A., N. Y. U. 7TH ANNuAL CoNF. ON LABOR 301
(1954) (describing Board's conclusive reliance on employer speech and contending § 8(c)
was intended to overrule these decisions).
113 See 1 CHARLES I. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 193 (2d ed. 1983)
(reading § 8(c) to mean protected speech cannot be "determinative" but can be admissible
to show animus); infra notes 129-42 and accompanying text.
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wholesale exclusion of antiunion statements in cases involving the discharge of
a union supporter. They forcefully criticized this result. Senator Morse, for
example, regarded the phrase "as one of the most objectionable and destructive
provisions in the bill," because, in his view, it required the Board and courts to
close their eyes to the plain implications of speech, and... disregard clear and
probative evidence of motive, or prejudice, or bias. If an employee were
discharged for union activities, for example, the Board could not use as
evidence of the employer's purpose, any expressions which were not in
themselves coercive, no matter how revealing they might be of the employer's
true reasons for the discharge.1 14
In his veto message, moreover, President Truman reflected a similar
interpretation of section 8(c). In his view, "[a]n antiunion statement by an
employer, for example, could not be considered as evidence of motive, unless
it contained an explicit threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 115
Taft-Hartley was passed over this presidential veto.
Thus, this literal interpretation of section 8(c) was before Congress when it
enacted the bill. Importantly, however, it was rejected by one of the bill's chief
sponsors, Senator Taft, who answered these criticisms of section 8(c) on behalf
of the conference committee.1 16
In his report to the Senate, Taft, in response to claims that section 8(c)
would require the exclusion of evidence relevant to motive, emphatically stated
that section 8(c) "does not make incompetent, evidence which would ordinarily
be deemed relevant and admissible in courts of law." 117
114 93 CONG. REc. 6453 (1947). Senator Morse regarded this as an "astounding
proposition," noting that in other areas of the law, particularly criminal law, speech
regularly is used as evidence of motive.
Senator Morse was not alone in his criticisms of § 8(c). The House Minority Report,
for example, made precisely the same criticisms voiced by Senator Morse. H.R. MIN. REP.
No. 245, 80th Cong. 84 1st Sess., Rule 13.7(b), reprinted in LGISLATIVE HISTORY supra
note 71, at 375 ("By saying that statements are not to be considered as evidence, they insist
that the Board and the courts close their eyes to the plain implications of speech and
disregard clear and probative evidence. In no field of law are a man's statements excluded
as evidence of an illegal intention."); see also 93 CONG. REC. 6385 (1947) (remarks of
Rep. Madden) ("In no other field of law are a man's statements excluded as evidence of an
illegal intention."); 93 CONG. REC. 6503 (1947) (remarks of Senator Murray) (The
sweeping character of the prohibition is such that, if enacted into law, it will seriously
circumscribe the Board in the prevention of the unfair practices proscribed by the bill.").
115 93 CONG. REC. 7487 (1947).
116 There is no Senate conference report on the Taft-Hartley amendments, but Senator
Taft, the Senate's chief sponsor of the bill, placed a memorandum into the record "to make
clear the legislative intent." 93 CONG. REC. 6441, 6858 (1947).
117 93 CONG. REC. 6444 (1947). This statement has been specifically relied upon by
the Board in interpreting § 8(c) to permit the use of protected speech as background
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In response to Taft's report and during debate on the bill, Senator Pepper
pointedly asked the question at issue here: If an employer criticized unions on
Monday, could that statement be used as evidence if on Thursday he fired a
union supporter for allegedly discriminatory reasons? 118 Taft responded that
consideration of the statement would be proper, assuming there were other
circumstances to tie the statement in with the employer's action. 119
In response to further criticisms from Senators Pepper, Morse, and others,
Taft later clarified the reach of section 8(c) in terms that suggest it was meant
only to prevent the Board from using protected speech as the exclusive or
primary evidence of unlawful action. Taft stated:
There have also been a number of decisions by the Board in which
discharges of employees, even though there was no evidence in the
surrounding circunstances of discrimination, have been deemed unfair labor
practices simply because at one time or another the employer has expresssed
[sic] himself as not in favor of unionization of his employees. The object of this
section, therefore, is to make it clear that decisions of this sort cannot be made
under the conference bill. 120
The House Conference Report, moreover, expressed a similar point of
view, suggesting it was the Board's over reliance on protected speech that
section 8(c) was intended to prohibit. In explaining the need for section 8(c),
the House Conference Report criticized the Board for finding an employer had
acted for an illegal purpose on the basis of its speeches and publications. 121
evidence of motive. See Smith's Transfer Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 143, 162 (1966). But see
VAN ARKLE, supra note 65, at 23.
Senator Tafts statement, however, can be read as distinguishing "views, arguments,
and opinions" from "instructions, directions or other statements which might be deemed
admissions under ordinary rules of evidence," for he pointed out it was only the former
speech that would fl within § 8(c). Thus, an employer's statements, "I am firing you
because you are in the union," or his instruction to a subordinate to "get rid of Joe; he's a
union man," would be outside the ambit of § 8(c). It is possible this was Taft's only point.
In view of his overall remarks, however, this is unlikely.
118 93 CONG. REC. 6446 (1947) (remarks of Senator Pepper).
119 93 CONG. REC. 6446 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft). Taft went on, however, to
inconsistently declare that noncoercive speech could not be considered as evidence. Id.; see
VAN ARK=E, supra note 65, at 25-26 (noting the confusing and contradictory nature of
Taft's remarks).
120 93 CONG. REC. 6860 (1947) (emphasis added).
Professor Van Arkle read Taft's remarks as indicating the Board is not to accept
protected speech as evidence. VAN ARKLE, supra note 65, at 25. This is a misreading of
Taft's statement. Taft was not stating all such speech must be excluded but that § 8(c)
precluded the Board from relying on speech to establish motive when there was no other
evidence of discrimination.
121 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 71, at 549; see Cox, supra note 1, at 19 ("Another
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Admittedly, however, there is confusion in the debates, with Taft himself
at times suggesting that noncoercive views, arguments, or opinions may not be
used as evidence. 122 But whatever the contradictions in Tafts remarks, one
thing appears relatively clear: the conference committee did not intend that
section 8(c) be given the literal reading ascribed to it by Senators Pepper,
Morse, and others. While no definitive alternative reading was clearly
expressed, the view that section 8(c) would wholly bar any use of protected
speech was repeatedly rejected. 123
Moreover, it appears the conference committee's view of section 8(c) was
premised on the First Amendment. The committee apparently did not intend
section 8(c) to be construed to provide protections broader than those contained
in the constitution.124 Nor was there any intent for section 8(c) to alter the
normal rules of evidence.25
This confusing and contradictory debate over the meaning of section 8(c),
coupled with the Supreme Court's rejection of a literal reading, 126 establishes a
statutory ambiguity in the phrase "be evidence of."127 More precisely, there is
no clear and unambiguous congressional intent to exclude protected speech as
evidence of unlawful motive.
Accordingly, under Chevron,'12 the courts are not to decide which reading
of the statute, in view of the legislative history and the background of Board
practices against which it was adopted, is the better one. Instead, under
Chevron's step two, the courts must determine whether the Board's
construction is permissible.
source of support for [8(c)] was the view expressed in the conference report that the Board
too often based findings of unfair labor practices upon an employer's published dislike of
unions, instead of requiring proof that he had engaged in improper activities.").
122 93 CONG. REC. 6446 (1947); 93 CONG. REC. 6859 (1947); see VAN ARKLE,
supra note 65, at 26.
123 Id.
124 H.R. CONP. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 71, at 549. 93 CONG. REc. 6859 (1947). While Taft
and his committee may have been wrong concerning the First Amendment limits on using
speech as evidence, they apparently intended § 8(c) and the First Amendment to coincide.
125 Id.
126 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
127 The disagreement among the reviewing courts on the proper meaning of § 8(c)
further demonstrates the ambiguity of that section. See supra note 64, 85-86; see also
Christensen, supra note 46, at 264 (discussing the "revealing and confusing" nature of
§ 8(c)'s legislative history); Koretz, supra note 41, at 403, 411 (describing the legislative
history of § 8(c) as confusing and acknowledging it is not clear Congress intended to
legislate the extremes that might follow from a literal reading of § 8(c)); Wimberly &
Steckel, supra note 59, at 538-39 (noting that the legislative history of § 8(c) is unclear).
128 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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B. The Board's Construction of Section 8(c)
Section 8(c) could be read to exclude any evidentiary use of protected
speech or only to preclude the Board's using protected speech as the exclusive
or primary evidence of discrimination. 129 The Board has read section 8(c) to
permit the use of protected speech as "background" but not primary evidence
to establish unlawful motivation. 130 As set forth below, this is a permissible
construction of an ambiguous statutory provision.
First, one must consider that a literal reading of section 8(c) would conflict
with a specific statutory goal-the elimination of discrimination against
employees based on union activities. Precluding the Board from considering
noncoercive employer speech would handicap the Board in its search for
employer motive. 131 A reading of section 8(c) that harmonizes it with other
provisions of the NLRA is a reasonable one.132
Furthermore, the legislative history supports a view that the real purpose of
section 8(c) was not to prohibit all use of antiunion statements as circumstantial
evidence to show motive but was to preclude the Board from substituting
antiunion statements for proof of causation in a particular case.133 The
conferees were concerned with the Board's practice of finding an employer
guilty of a section 8(a)(3) violation "simply because" the employer had
expressed opposition to unions. 134 A conclusion that it was this Board practice
toward which section 8(c)'s "be evidence of" language was directed is a
reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Moreover, the legislative history of section 8(c) demonstrates the purpose
of that section was to clarify Congress' intent not to tamper with First
129 See supra notes 107-28 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text; see also General Elec. Co., 150
N.L.R.B. 192, 280 (1964) (rejecting an "absolutist view" of § 8(c) as "at odds with the
legislative history.")
131 See id. at 280-81; Norman F. Burke, Employer Free Speech, 26 FORDHAM L.
REV. 266, 274 (1957) (noting a literal reading of § 8(c) "would certainly stultify the inquiry
into employer's motive by denying the Board the use of an important source of evidence.
Consideration of an employer's remarks in most cases would not be conclusive of an issue
but they certainly would be influential in making any intelligent judgment."); see also supra
notes 12, 85.
132 See NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694
(1951); Smith's Transfer Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 143, 162 (1966).
133 See supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text; see also Christensen & Svanoe,
supra note 1, at 1284 ("In the course of debates on the 1947 amendments, Congress
indicated its concern that the Board was too frequently translating general animus into
specific causation of a particular action."). But see Bok, supra note 50, at 103 n.179
(suggesting Congress' intent in passing § 8(c) was to keep the Board from using employer
speech as evidence of unlawful motive).134 See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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Amendment rights.135 Acknowledging no statute need codify what the
constitution protects, legislators nonetheless wanted to "send a message" that
Congress intended no infringement of constitutionally protected speech. 136
Those congressmen reading section 8(c) to prohibit any use of protected
speech as evidence of an unfair labor practice were quick to point out this
restriction was beyond the reach of the First Amendment. 137 As set forth in the
following section, they were correct, 138 a reading that lends support to the
Board's interpretation of the statute. Because Congress meant only to codify
First Amendment protections and because the First Amendment would not
preclude using noncoercive speech as evidence of an unfair labor practice,
section 8(c) may reasonably be read to permit use of this evidence to establish
unlawful motivation. 139
At the same time, however, section 8(c) does preclude using protected
speech as the basis for an unfair labor practice finding. The legislative history
reflects a concern over the Board's use of noncoercive, antiunion speech as its
exclusive or primary proof that an employer acted with an unlawful motive.40
135 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
136 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947) (purpose of
section 8(c)'s "be evidence of" is "to protect the right of free speech"), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY supra note 71, at 549; see, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 4832 (1947);
Koretz, supra note 41, at 403; Margulies, supra note 54, at 460; George Rose, Is the NLRB
Tampering with Freedom of Speech? 15 U. PrrT. L. REV. 462, 469 (1954); Wimaberly &
Steckel, supra note 59, at 547.137 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
138 See infra notes 150-78 and accompanying text.
139 The Board has recognized this point. See, e.g., Smith's Transfer Corp., 162
N.L.R.B. 143, 162 n.36 (1966); see also Christensen, supra note 46, at 265 (recognizing
that § 8(c) should be read only as restating, not extending, constitutional guarantees). But
see supra note 78 (contending § 8(c) conferred immunity beyond that provided by the First
Amendment).
Moreover, the Court confirmed that neither § 8(c) nor the First Amendment precludes
consideration of the totality of the circumstances in determining whether speech is coercive.
In doing so, the Court read § 8(e) as coextensive with the First Amendment, despite
conflicting legislative history on this point. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969); see supra note 72 and accompanying text. This interpretation of § 8(c) supports the
Board's First Amendment-driven reading of § 8(c).
140 See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
There is some indication that the Supreme Court regards this as an appropriate reading
of § 8(c). See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 n.5 (1966) ("It is more likely
that Congress adopted this section for a narrower purpose, i.e., to prevent the Board from
attributing anti-union motive to an employer on the basis of his past statements.") (emphasis
added); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264, 276 (1974) (same quotation). But see NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357
U.S. 357, 370 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting and concurring) (Noncoercive employer
speech is protected by § 8(c) and "so cannot be used to show that the contemporaneous
enforcement of the no-distribution rule was an unfair labor practice.").
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The Board has accepted this limit of section 8(c), acknowledging protected
speech may be used only as "background" evidence against which motive may
be assessed. 141
From time to time, however, reviewing courts have accused the Board of
relying too heavily on protected speech. When the reviewing courts have found
the evidence of unlawful motive consists primarily of protected speech, they
have properly relied on section 8(c) to refuse enforcement of the Board's
order. 142 While the Board may disagree with the courts' assessment of the
evidence in those cases, it has yet to disagree with this view of the statute,
which presumably mirrors its own.
Left unexplored to date, however, is whether this prohibition is
constitutionally mandated. The suggestion that the First Amendment both
permits and limits the evidentiary use of protected speech, a suggestion with
which Congress ostensibly was in agreement when it passed section 8(c), is
discussed in the remaining sections.
V. DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT LIMIT THE USE OF PROTECTED
SPEECH AS EVIDENCE OF AN UNFAIR LABOR PRAcTICE?
The notion that the First Amendment prohibits the use of protected speech
as evidence of an unlawful act is novel. Speech the First Amendment would
protect from outright prohibition routinely is used as evidence of civil or
criminal culpability in other contexts, without First Amendment objections. 143
Some lower courts, moreover, have interpreted § 8(c) as permitting protected speech
to be used as background evidence of unlawful motive, further supporting the
reasonableness of the Board's construction. As stated by the court in NLRB v. General
Elec. Co., "The objective of section 8(c) then, was to impose a rule of relevancy on the
Board in evaluating the legality of statements by parties to a labor dispute. Its purpose was
hardly to eliminate all communication from the Board's purview, for to do so would be to
emasculate a statute whose structure depends heavily on evaluation of motive and intent."
418 F.2d 736, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1969) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970).
See also supra note 85; MORRIS, supra note 113, at 193.
141 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
142 See, e.g., NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666 (1st Cir.
1979) (criticizing the Board for viewing all evidence against an employer once it is
concluded that an employer is opposed to unions); Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d
735 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The Board cannot find unlawful motive based solely on the general
bias or anti-union attitude of the employer.").
143 This was the point made by Senators Pepper and Morse, among others, when
literally reading and criticizing § 8(c). See supra notes 114-18; Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) ("[I]t has never been deemed an abridgement of
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written
or printed.") (emphasis added).
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That such objections have been raised in the context of labor speech, moreover,
is ironic, given the relatively low First Amendment protection labor speech
traditionally has been afforded. 144 No doubt it is section 8(c), with its language
restricting the evidentiary uses of protected speech, that has forced awareness
of First Amendment concerns in labor cases.
Because the First Amendment and section 8(c) protect an employer's right
to voice an opinion on unions and even to mount an antiunion campaign, courts
have reasoned that allowing the Board to use that speech against the employer
in any way is an impermissible back door assault on First Amendment
freedoms. 145 Using the speech against the employer, in the eyes of the these
courts, puts a "bait and switch" gloss on the First Amendment: employers have
the "right" to speak out against a union, but if they grab the bait, they have set
themselves up for unfair labor practice charges when they thereafter take
managerial actions. 146
The problem with this argument is that it expands First Amendment
protections too far. Using speech as evidence of unlawful motive is not the
same thing as directly banning the speech. The speech itself is not outlawed.
An independent act is needed for liability. Moreover, when liability turns on a
defendant's motive or intent, speech quite often is probative evidence of state of
mind. 147 To exclude such evidence from the record deprives the decisionnaker
of facts necessary to reach a fully informed and just decision. The First
Amendment has never been construed by the Supreme Court to demand this
result. 148
See also Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendnent: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265 (1981). Professor Schauer recognizes the obvious point that
speech frequently is used as evidence of or an element for liability in various contexts, such
as prosecutions for extortion, perjury or threats or in civil litigation for breach of contract or
price-fixing. Id. at 268-74. He suggests, however, that perhaps such speech should not be
covered by the First Amendment at all. Id. at 273; see also Kent Greenawalt, Speech and
Cime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 645 (1980) (noting speech frequently is used to
establish criminal intentwithout First Amendment objections).
144 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
145 See, e.g., NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 670 (1st
Cir. 1979) ("To use protected expression to build a case would seem to make the Act a
trap."); NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 774 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 965 (1970) (Friendly, J., concurring and dissenting) (using protected speech against an
employer "constitutes a serious indentation of § 8(c) and (d), if not, indeed, of the First
Amendment."); NLRB v. Colvert Dairy Prods. Co., 317 F.2d 44, 46 (10th Cir. 1963) ("To
allow the privileged communications to become an instrument of destruction by indirection
is to frustrate the right of free speech and the privilege of persuasion.").
146 Id.; see also Iserman, supra note 112, at 303.
14 7 See supra notes 82, 85, 131 and accompanying text.
148 But see Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 615 n.3 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
In Street, the Court overturned a flag burning conviction because of the possibility that the
defendant was convicted for his speech, as opposed to his act, when the statute in question
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At the same time, these courts are correct to question whether the First
Amendment places some limits on the use of protected speech as evidence
against employers. There is a First Amendment interest present that must be
balanced against the need for the evidence. What the courts have failed to
recognize is that the question is one of degree. To allow the Board to take the
employer's antiunion stance into account when considering whether a particular
action was motivated by antiunion animus is different from allowing the Board
to find an employer discriminated against a particular employee simply because
the employer opposed unionization. If employers know they will be found
guilty of section 8(a)(3) violations simply because they have opposed unions,
the First Amendment right to speak out has been no less impermissibly chilled
than if the speech itself were made unlawful. 149
A. The First Amendment Does Not Require the Exclusion of Protected
Speech as Evidence of an Unfair Labor Practice
Most First Amendment cases involve laws that directly restrict speech. 150
It is well recognized, however, that abridgment of First Amendment rights can
occur indirectly as well. 151 Thus, just because speech is not being directly
prohibited, as it would be, for example, were the NLRA construed to prohibit
any antiunion statements by an employer, does not mean that no First
Amendment issue exists.
When the government directly restricts speech, the regulation receives what
Professor Laurence Tribe describes as "Track One" analysis, and the
regulation is presumptively unconstitutional. 152 To be sustained, it must fall
made speaking "contemptuous" words, as well as committing contemptuous acts, an
offense. Justice White argued the Court's decision essentially precluded using speech to
prove intent, since such a conviction would be based in part on speech. The majority,
however, disavowed that reading of its decision. For further discussion of Street, see infra
note 158 and accompanying text.149 See infra notes 179-231 and accompanying text.
150 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
151 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); see LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw § 12-2 (2d ed.
1988). But see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 4745, 4748 (1991) (Scalia, I.,
concurring). Justice Scala would not recognize a First Amendment issue when a law is not
directed at expression.
152 TRIBE, supra note 151; see John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the
Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1482, 1484 (1975). The Tribe/Ely approach distinguishes between regulations aimed at the
communicative impact of speech and those that are not aimed at ideas or information but
which nonetheless abridge speech. Professor Nimmer follows a similar approach, dividing
speech restrictions into "anti-speech," similar to Tribe's Track One restrictions, and "non-
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within certain narrow exceptions to First Amendment protections or be justified
by a compelling state interest. 153
But when the law at issue is not one directly restricting speech, the First
Amendment analysis proceeds on "Track Two." 154 Under Track Two, the
Court uses a "relatively lenient" balancing approach to determine whether the
infringement occurring is outweighed by the governmental interests served by
the regulation. 155 When a government regulation "is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest," the First Amendment challenge will be rejected. 156 This balancing
speech," which are analogous to Track Two. MELV.LE B. NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 2.04 (1984).
Professor Tribe's approach has been criticized by various commentators. See, e.g.,
MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 87-126 (1984); Thomas T. Emerson, First
Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L. REV. 422, 470-74 (1980); Daniel
A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J.
727 (1980). Moreover, various alternative structures have been suggested. See, e.g.,
Emerson, supra (distinguishing between expression and action); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cmn. L. REv. 46 (1987) (distinguishing between
content-based and content-neutral restrictions).
Nonetheless, criticisms directed toward Professor Tribe's approach have been
acknowledged to be more accurately directed toward the Court itself, because the Tribe/Ely
"two-track" approach, whatever its theoretical merit, reflects the Court's treatment of First
Amendment issues. As Professor Emerson admits, "All in all, Tribe's doctrinal structure
comes closer to describing the present state of First Amendment theory than providing a
coherent and effective substitute." Emerson, supra at 474.
153 TRIBE, supra note 151. Direct abridgements have been upheld when the speech
constitutes a "clear and present danger," is a defamatory fllsehood, or is obscene.154 Id. Professor Emerson has criticized this "two-track" approach, in part because he
says there is no meaningful distinction between the two tracks. Almost all regulations, he
says, are directed at the harms caused by speech and not at the speech itself and thus could
be characterized as indirect. Also, and perhaps accordingly, he sees no reason to give Track
Two regulations less stringent scrutiny. Emerson, supra note 152, at 472-74. See also
Redish, supra note 152, at 102-26.
155 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). See David S. Day, The Incidental
Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 491 (1988).
156 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The O'Brien test applies to
government regulation that incidentally or indirectly infringes on speech. Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989). While O'Brien was a "speech as conduct" case involving the burning
of a draft card, its balancing test is not limited to "speech as conduct" but properly applies
whenever freedom of expression conflicts with the government's expression-unrelated
interests. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949); Ely, supra note 152, at 1484; see also Day, supra note 155; Keith Werhan,
The O'Briening of Free Speech Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635 (1987). Moreover, at
least one commentator has recognized that the O'Brien balancing test is appropriate for
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between the values of free speech and the government's regulatory interest
must be struck on a case-by-case basis, with the government interest prevailing
so long as speech is not unduly stifled.157
Accordingly, it cannot be seriously contended that any speech the First
Amendment protects from being outlawed is thereby protected from any
incidental infringement by the government. That speech is protected in the
sense that it may not be regarded as a section 8(a)(1) violation does not mean it
is protected from use as evidence of another unfair labor practice, if that
evidentiary use is only an indirect regulation of the speech.
There is some support for an argument that public, ideological speech
should be wholly inadmissible as evidence of improper motive.' 58 Relying on
determining whether using speech as evidence violates the First Amendment. Note,
Conspiracy and the First Amendnent, 79 YALE L.J 872 (1970).
157 TRIBE, supra note 151.
Professor Redish agrees that a balancing process, in which the judiciary should
accommodate free speech with competing governmental interests, must occur, but he would
subject all government regulation of speech, whether direct or indirect, to a compelling
interest analysis. REDISH, supra note 152, at 116-25; see also Emerson, supra note 152, at
472-74.
158 The Supreme Court has not directly confronted this issue but has flirted with it
from time to time. The Court overturned a flag burning conviction because it may have
been based in whole or in part on protected speech. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969). Although the majority denied it had done so, Justice White contended the Court had
effectively precluded the use of speech to prove an element of a crime. He stated,
Arguably, under today's decision any conviction for flag burning where the
defendant's words are critical to proving intent or some other element of the crime
would be invalid since the conviction would be based in part on speech. The Court
disclaims this result, but without explaining why it would not reverse a conviction for
burning where words spoken at the time are necessarily used to prove a case and yet
reverse burning convictions on precisely the same evidence simply because on that
evidence the defendant might have been convicted for speaking. The Court's seemingly
narrow holding may be of potentially broader application ....
394 U.S. at 615 n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
The previous year, dissenting from a denial of certiorari, Justice Douglas urged the
Court to determine whether activities protected by the First Amendment can be used as
overt acts to establish a conspiracy. Epton v. New York, 390 U.S. 29, 32 (1968) (Douglas,
I., dissenting). He asked the Court to determine whether speech must first be found
constitutionally unprotected before it may be relied upon as an element of a crime. The
Court declined the invitation. See also Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (state could not
disqualify legislator from membership based on statements protected by the First
Amendment).
At least one commentator has relied on these statements to argue constitutionally
protected speech should be inadmissible to prove conspiracy. Note, supra note 156.
According to the author, using protected speech as evidence results in the same chilling
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United States v. Johnson,159 Professor Greenawalt urges as a constitutional rule
that public communication not facially demonstrating a wrongful intent be
inadmissible to prove intent.160 Professor Greenawalt, however, fails to
distinguish between direct and indirect regulation of speech, apparently
assuming any evidentiary usage of "high value speech" would be subject to
strict constitutional scrutiny.
Using protected speech as background evidence to establish unlawful
motive is an indirect regulation of speech. The rules of evidence that let in this
evidence extend to all types of relevant proof, not simply to protected speech.
Moreover, the governmental interest in admitting all such relevant evidence in
order to facilitate a fair and fully informed determination of the employer's
motive and thereby to ensure that unlawful discrimination does not go
unsanctioned is both important and unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. Employers remain free to express their views on unions; they
simply cannot discriminate against employees because of antiunion animus.161
As Professor Ely observes, it is essential to distinguish the government's
ultimate objective from the causal connection asserted by the state, because the
effect posed by a prosecution for the speech itself. Id. at 894. The author urges total
exclusion of this evidence. Id. at 895.
This Note has been criticized for advocating too broad a rule, in that it fails to
distinguish between various categories of speech. See Greenawalt, supra note 143, at 777.
Professor Greenawalt argues that when the protected speech is private and not of public
concern, barring its admission into evidence would be "ludicrous." Id. However, when the
speech is public and ideological, Professor Greenawalt would agree it should be excluded.
See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
159 383 U.S. 169 (1966). At issue in United States v. Johnson was whether
congressional speech protected by the speech and debate clause could be used as an overt
act in a conspiracy prosecution. The Court held the protected speech could not be relied
upon to establish conspiracy but carefully limited its holding to speech on the floor of
Congress.
160 Greenawalt, supra note 143, at 778 ("An appropriate constitutional rule would
perhaps be that communication, or at least public communication, may not be introduced to
prove intent, or be considered an overt act, unless on its face it clearly shows criminal intent
(as a statement about one's future criminal acts) or is plainly a step in a criminal plan (as the
account of bank security would be if the author were not also writing an article on bank
security for some journal).").
In a later writing, Professor Greenawalt appears to have retreated somewhat from this
position, although his previous conclusions are not disavowed. He recently has argued that
nonideological speech, whether public or private, can be used as evidence but contends that
ideological speech cannot be used as an overt act. K. GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIMES
AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 245-46 (1989).
Professor Greenawalt further recognizes that constitutional limits on speech should be
the same for civil and criminal penalties, observing that the specter of civil penalties often
can be as deterring as criminal ones. Greenawalt, supra note 143, at 780.
161 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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ultimate objective "always will be unrelated to expression." 162 Here, however,
both the ultimate objective, avoiding discrimination on the basis of union
activity, and the causal connection, determining whether an unlawful reason
motivated a particular action, are unrelated to expression. In determining
motive, the Board takes into account not only antiunion speech but evidence
"favorable to the [employer] regarding its union relationships." 163 This use of
speech is content neutral and is aimed at determining motive, not at restricting
speech. Use of the more lenient balancing approach reserved for incidental
regulation of speech is thus appropriate when the speech is not the exclusive or
primary proof of wrongdoing. 164
The remaining inquiry boils down to whether use of protected speech as
circumstantial, background evidence to prove unlawful motive "is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance" of the government's interest in a
nondiscriminatory workplace. 165 When the protected speech is considered
along with other proof of unlawful motive, it meets this test.
The Supreme Court has never held protected speech may not be used as
evidence of unlawful motive. Instructive, moreover, is the Court's Virginia
162 Ely, supra note 152, at 1497.
163 Smith's Transfer Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 143, 164 n.43 (1966).
164 See infra notes 179-232 and accompanying text; see also Lange, supra note 20, at
133 (contending that Title VII's restrictions on free speech pose only "incidental burdens"
on First Amendment rights).
165 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also TRIBE, supra
note 151, at §§ 12-2, 12-23 (discussing the need for a case-by-case balancing when
confronting indirect regulation of speech).
It is important that this final prong have some teeth in it. As Professor Ely observes, a
weak formulation of this prong would insufficiently protect First Amendment interests.
Thus, Ely contends the proper inquiry is whether there is a "less restrictive alternative,"
which requires a "serious balancing of interests." Ely, supra note 152, at 1484-86.
Professor Ely suggests the Court will engage in a serious balancing of interests when
"traditional means of expression, such as pamphlets, pickets, public speeches and rallies,"
are being incidentally abridged. Id. at 1488. Professor Tribe would require the balancing to
be performed with a "thumb on the scale" in favor of free expression. TRIBE, supra note
151, at § 12-2; see also Day, supra note 155, at 529-30 (criticizing the Court for recently
reducing its level of scrutiny in incidental regulation cases).
The Court found this final prong is satisfied when the regulation "promotes a
substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quoting United
States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). But it recognized this standard of review,
although highly deferential to the government, will not permit the government to "regulate
expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not
serve to advance its goals." Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
It bears noting the expression being infringed in Ward was not the traditional form of
expression Professor Ely suggests will receive closer scrutiny by the Court. In any event,
the Court will not uphold an indirect abridgement that is substantially broader than
necessary to meet the government's expression-unrelated interests.
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Electric decision, which established an employer's First Amendment right to
speak out against unions. 166 In Virginia Electric, the Court held an employer's
noncoercive, antiunion speech could not be regarded as an unfair labor
practice. 167 At the same time, however, the Court approved a "totality of the
circumstances" standard for assessing the legality of employer speech and
actions. 168
At issue in Virginia Electric was whether facially protected speech could be
deemed unprotected when considered against the totality of the employer's
conduct. 169 But the "'totality-of-conduct and (use of noncoercive statements as
evidence) concepts are as the two sides of a coin."1 70 As Professor Elkouri has
observed, "Use of background circumstances to give meaning to words, and
use of background words to give meaning to acts, are techniques of similar
essence,... that is, use of background to reveal latent meaning. The ultimate
objective in each case is to determine whether the employer was unfair in the
light of the entire picture .... 171
Permitting the Board to consider protected speech as part of the totality of
the circumstances surrounding a particular employment action ensures that the
Board and reviewing courts are not unduly hampered in ferreting out unlawful
motive. There is a strong governmental interest in ensuring that employees are
not punished because of union activities. 172 Determining an employer's state-
166 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
167 Id. at 477; see supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Virginia Electric.
168 314 U.S. at 477; see Note, Labor Law Reforn, supra note 40, at 759.
169 The question in Virginia Electric was whether the speech itself could be prohibited,
i.e., considered to be coercive and thus a § 8(a)(1) violation. The Court was not directly
resolving the question of whether noncoercive speech could be used to establish unlawful
conduct.17 0 Elkouri, supra note 72, at 81 n.20.
171 Id. (emphasis added). Elkouri's point is demonstrated by the Court's reasoning in
Virginia Electric, in which it relied on the need to use language to prove unlawful conduct
in discussing why it was permissible to look at acts to give meaning to words. As the Court
stated, "conduct, though evidenced in part by speech, may amount... to coercion within
the meaning of the Act." 314 U.S. at 477. The Court affirmed the Board's right to look at
what an employer said, not simply what it did, in determining whether there has been
unlawful interference. "The mere fact that language merges into a course of conduct does
not put that whole course without the range of otherwise applicable administrative power."
Id. at 478.
See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), in which the Court approved, in a
defamation case, discovery inquiries into reporters' editorial processes in order to establish
actual malice. The Court noted that prohibiting discovery would substantially interfere with
the plaintiff's ability to establish liability and would inhibit obtaining accurate results. Id. at
170.
172 See Radio Officers' Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S.
17 (1954); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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of-mind, moreover, is a difficult task, as employers rarely concede they acted
for unlawful reasons. 173 When motive is an essential element of a claim and
when motive is evidenced by speech, fair resolution of the claim demands this
relevant evidence be placed before the trier of fact.174 Allowing the Board to
consider all of the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the
employer's antiunion stance, helps ensure that correct determinations are
made. 175 Creating a First Amendment evidentiary privilege would unduly
burden the governmental interest in assuring a nondiscriminatory workplace.
At the same time, the lawful speech is being used only as background,
circumstantial evidence to assist in determining motive, 176 and thus does not
overreach in achieving the governmental interest. Any chilling effect from this
use of protected speech, moreover, is slight. In the last forty years, there is no
suggestion employers have refrained from lawful speech because their speech
could be used as evidence in unfair labor practice proceedings. Employers have
actively campaigned against unions in the face of the Board's practice of
173 NLRB v. South Shore Hosp., 571 F.2d 677, 682 (1st Cir. 1978). As the Board has
obseived, state of mind usually can be established only by circumstantial evidence. General
Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 281 (1964); see Burke, supra note 131, at 274 (recognizing
that denying the Board use of employer speech would "stultify" the inquiry into motive);
Cox, supra note 1, at 19, 21 (noting motive is an elusive subject of inquiry and that "[in
such cases, expression of desire or opinion will often indicate the motive of otherwise
ambiguous acts . . . ."); Weiler, supra note 15, at 1802 ("The judgment whether an
employer acted with discriminatory motive requires delicate inference from a mosaic of
circumstantial evidence," including anti-union speech.). See supra notes 82, 85, 131 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties involved in establishing motive.
174 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 159-75 (1979).
A lower court noted that protected statements "'do lend a significance to
otherwise ambiguous events when the question is whether a given course of
conduct was actuated by anti-union animus.' The incidents cited, whether lawful
or not, do not prove [the employee] was discharged because of his union activity.
But they do show that the company knew of his activity and was displeased by it;
they thus provide a relevant background for analyzing the circumstances of the
discharge."
NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 907 n.14 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting NLRB v. Lowell
Sun Publishing Co., 320 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1963)), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); see
also Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989); NLRB v. General Elec. Co.,
418 F.2d 736, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970); K. Greenawalt,
supra note 160 at 245.
175 Id. Qf Rosney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Asswnpions About Racist
and Se dt Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 186 (1990) (contending there is no First
Amendment problem in using speech to identify racist or sexist behavior in the workplace
because workplace speech is transactional and thus entitled to low protection).
176 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
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considering those lawful campaigns as background evidence to determine
unlawful motive.177
In summary, the Board's practice of using protected speech to assist in
identifying unlawful conduct is constitutional. 178 Any infringement on the
employer's First Amendment interest in speaking out against unions is no
greater than is essential to further the government's interest in protecting
employees from unlawful discrimination.
B. First Amendment Limits on the Use of Protected Speech
Having concluded wholesale exclusion of protected speech is not required
by the First Amendment, the question becomes whether any First Amendment
limits on the evidentiary use of protected speech exist. They do. While it is
permissible to use protected speech as evidence of unlawful motive, the Board
cannot use protected speech as the exclusive or primary proof that a union
supporter was fired because of the employer's antiunion animus. When the
protected speech is in essence the government's case, its use is a direct
abridgement of speech, and the chilling effect on the speech outweighs the
government's interest in using it to prove unlawful conduct. 179
In practical effect, using protected speech as the exclusive or primary
evidence of unlawful motive differs little from a direct prohibition against the
speech. When the principal evidence of unlawfulness is protected speech, the
employer is being penalized for his speech, not for his actions. This
governmental use of the evidence is not an incidental regulation of speech but is
direct and therefore deserving of stringent Track One analysis.180
177 Employer campaigns actually have increased in recent years. See PAUL C.
WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 108-13 (1990).
Professor Stone contends that when the "content-neutral" restriction poses little
interference with the ability to communicate views, it gets a very deferential level of
scrutiny. Stone, supra note 152, at 111-14. Here, because very little interference is
occurring, the government's burden for justifying the use of speech is relatively light.
17 8 But see Note, supra note 156, at 895 n. 105 (contending that any evidentiary use of
protected speech is unconstitutional, because the danger is too great the conviction may
have been based primarily on the protected speech).
This argument gives insufficient weight to the difficulties inherent in establishing
motive. It also gives too little credit to courts' ability to distinguish between convictions or
liability based primarily on protected speech and those that are not. See infra notes 197-211
and accompanying text.
179 See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
180 See Ely, supra note 152, at 1497 (discussing the need to identify whether an
ostensibly non-speech-related regulation in fact is directed toward speech); TRIBE, supra
note 151, at § 12-3 (discussing when a regulation should be placed on "Track One"); see
also Stone, supra note 152, at 48. Professor Stone's position is that when "high value"
speech is at issue and the restriction is content-based, the restriction is unconstitutional
because it will be unable to withstand strict scrutiny.
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As Professor Tribe hypothesizes, a statute making it a misdemeanor to
wear or hold a United States flag while speaking critically of the United States
is a direct regulation of speech; it restricts speech based on its viewpoint and
will receive strict scrutiny.' 81 Making protected speech the exclusive evidence
of a section 8(a)(3) violation is no different. Such a rule essentially makes it
unlawful for an employer to fire a union adherent while speaking critically
about unions. Only the most compelling governmental interest could support
this restriction.18 2
Alternatively, if one views this usage as only an indirect abridgement of
speech, the balancing process required under Track Two must be struck in
favor of the speech. Using the protected speech as the exclusive or primary
evidence of discrimination increases the likelihood that lawful speech will be
chilled,18 3 while at the same time decreasing the chances that a just and fully
181 TRIBE, supra note 151, at § 12-3; see Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (State
cannot disqualify a legislator under color of a proper standard when the disqualification in
fact is based on statements protected by the First Amendment); see also United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), in which speech was used as an overt act to establish
liability. The Court considered this a direct abridgement of speech.
Also illustrative is Professor Schauer's hypothetical based on Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). In Brandenburg, the Court struck down a prosecution
based on an inflammatory racist speech, holding a prosecution could be maintained only
where advocacy is directed toward and likely to produce imminent lawless action. Professor
Schauer hypothesizes that if one of Brandenburg's listeners had then committed an unlawful
battery on a minority group member, the victim could not sue Brandenburg for negligently
causing her injury because Brandenburg would have a First Amendment defense. Frederick
Schauer, Mrs. Palsgraf and the First Amendment, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 161, 162-63
(1990).
Professor Schauer uses his illustration to distinguish speech within the First
Amendment's protection from speech without it. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying
text. But his hypothetical First Amendment defense depends not only on the character of the
speech but on the direct abridgement that is occurring through its use. His hypothetical
cause of action is based on the protected speech, and thus the regulation will receive strict
scrutiny. See Hercey v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Walt Disney Prods. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981).
See also Strauss, supra note 20 (using a "compelling interest" analysis in determining
whether sexual harrassment laws violate the First Amendment).
182 TRIBE, supra note 151, at § 12-3. As Professor Tribe notes, the government,
ironically, may be better off adopting a more restrictive means. Id. For example, were
Congress to outlaw any firings of workers during a union campaigu, no matter the
employer's motive, on the theory that such terminations are inherently coercive, the statute
presumably would be upheld. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971);
Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 1, at 1326-27; see also supra notes 27-29 and
accompanying text.
183 See Stone, supra note 152, at 113-14, who recognizes the level of scrutiny of a
"content neutral" restriction should increase in accordance with the chilling effect on
speech.
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informed decision on employer motivation will be made. 184 The government's
regulation thus would be burdening speech in a manner that does not advance
the government's goals. 185
Because protected antiunion speech is not direct proof that discrimination
occurred, 186 there is no compelling or even substantial governmental interest in
permitting the government to rely exclusively on the constitutionally protected
speech to establish unlawful motivation. Direct evidence is evidence that, if
believed, allows the trier of fact to make only one inference. 187 For example, a
statement by an employer that he fired A because he was a union supporter is
direct evidence of discrimination. 188 If the trier of fact believes the employer,
there is only one inference to be drawn-that A was fired because of his union
activities. 189
This speech, however, may be viewed as unprotected antiunion speech
under either section 8(c) or the First Amendment, as it involves no statement of
views, arguments or opinions and/or because it is coercive. 190 The Board could
184 See infra notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
185 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
186 See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
187 See Lyman R. Patterson, The Types of Evidence: An Analysis, 19 VAND. L. REV.
1, 4-5 (1965). As Professor Patterson explains, direct evidence is evidence that is consistent
"only with either the proposed conclusion or its contradictory." His example is the
statement "I saw D kill H." If believed by the trier of fact, there is only one inference to be
made-that D killed H. "The inferential process is so simple that the presence of the
inference is not apparent."
See also Randle v. LaSalle Communications, 697 F. Supp. 1474, 1479 n.3 (N.D. IM.
1988), af'd, 876 F.2d 563 (7th Cir. 1989).
188 See Rollins v. Tech South Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987). For a
detailed discussion of direct versus circumstantial evidence in the employment
discrimination context, see Edwards, supra note 2.
189 Edwards, supra note 2, at 13; Patterson, supra note 187, at 4-5.
190 That the speech is not covered by § 8(c) is clear, as that statute shelters only
"views, argument or opinion" and does not protect other speech, such as admissions,
directions or instructions. This point was emphasized by Senator Taft on several occasions.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
*The speech also is not protected by the First Amendment, in the sense that the Board
could constitutionally prohibit the speech. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969), the Court read § 8(c) as coextensive with the First Amendment, at least for purposes
of determining whether speech could be held unlawful. The Board, for example, properly
could view this speech as coercive.
Some commentators, moreover, have urged that "performative" or "transactional"
speech deserves no or low First Amendment protection. See Greenawalt, supra note 143;
K. GREENAWALT, supra note 160; NMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 152, at
3-36; Schaner, supra note 143; Smolla, supra note 175; Cass Sunstein, Pornography and
the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L. J. 589.
As Professor Schauer states,
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base its case exclusively or primarily on such speech without confronting any
First Amendment limitation 191
However, when an employer engages in protected labor speech, as he does
when he urges his employees to vote against the union, 192 the speech does not
independently compel a finding that discrimination occurred. While the speech
is direct evidence that the employer wants his employees to vote against the
union, it does not directly establish that the employer discriminated against any
particular employee. 193 Instead, the trier of fact must make a further
When an act of communication is directed at a private transaction and not at social
change, when it is delivered fare to face or individually rather than at the world at large,
when it seeks to convey information and not argument, and when it pertains only to
topics well beyond the range of topics perceived to involve the values of the First
Amendment, then with the convergence of all four of these fictors, there does not seem
to be any reason to convert what would otherwise be a pure tort action into anything
else. Conversely, when the communication involved is aimed at issues of public
concern, is directed to a large audience, has normative content and pertains to the kinds
of speech that the First Amendment intends to protect, then the fact that an action
nominally sounds in traditional tort language is no mandate for concluding that the First
Amendment does not provide the driving engine in the analysis.
Schauer, supra note 181, at 169. Under the approaches of these commentators, statements
correctly viewed as direct evidence of discrimination would be entitled to little or no First
Amendment protection.
But protected labor speech, i.e., noncoercive statements of views, argument and
opinion, would be "high value" speech. It is aimed at an issue of public concern, usually is
directed toward a large audience, seeks to influence or persuade, and pertains to a topic,
workplace governance, that involves values the First Amendment seeks to protect. See
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
191 See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text. Even if the speech were protected,
there would be a compelling governmental interest in permitting its use and in permitting a
liability finding based on such speech because it would be highly probative evidence of
unlawful discrimination.
192 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
193 See NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
989 (1982) (Board must not only show animus but a causal link between the animus and the
discharge); NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666 (1st Cir. 1979)
(dislike of unions not enough to establish discrimination); Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 587
F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1979) (proof of anti-union animus is not enough for a § 8(a)(3) violation;
a causal connection between the animus and the discharge must be shown).
For a discussion of this point in the analogous Title VII context, see Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (stereotyped remarks do not "inevitably prove" gender
was a motivating factor in decision); Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 875 F.2d 1325
(7th Cir. 1989) (statements of racial prejudice insufficient to establish nexus between race
and demotion); Rollins v. Tech South Inc., 833 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1987) (statements by
supervisor that he did not like working with older women was not direct evidence, because
any discrimination must be inferred); Crader v. Concordia College, 724 F. Supp. 558
(N.D. II. 1989) (evidence that decisionmaker had a "deep-rooted" prejudice against blacks
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inference--that the antiunion animus of the employer led him to discriminate
against the employee. 194
Accordingly, requiring the Board to come forward with additional evidence
to support the second inference and thus to prove unlawful motive insures that
an employer is not being punished "simply because" of his protected speech. 195
The government's interest is in prohibiting discrimination, and that interest is
not furthered by undue reliance on inconclusive evidence.
The Board and reviewing courts must be sensitive to this First Amendment
concern, which underlies and coincides with section 8(c), when assessing
evidence of unlawful motive. Using protected speech as part of the "totality of
the circumstances" is permissible, 196 but using it as the principal evidence to
support a finding of discrimination is statutorily and constitutionally improper.
No "bright line" rule can be drawn for determining when protected speech
predominates in a particular case. 197 Undoutedly, there will be close questions
was not direct evidence that racial bias motivated the particular decision at issue); Randle v.
LaSalle Communications, 697 F. Supp. 1474 (N.D. ]MI. 1987), af'd, 876 F.2d 563 (7th Cir.
1989) (direct evidence of racial bias is not direct evidence that defendant discriminated
against plaintiff); Spanier v. Morrison's Management Services, 611 F. Supp. 642 (D. Ala.
1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 822 F.2d 975 (1lth Cir. 1987) (credible proof of a
sexual bias is not tantamount to proof the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive); see
also Edwards, supra note 2, at 26. But see EEOC v. Alton Packing Corp., 901 F.2d 920
(11th Cir. 1990) (racial slurs direct evidence plaintiff was not promoted because of race);
Senello v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 393 (1lth Cir. 1989) (discriminatory comments
by supervisor direct proof discrimination occurred).
While these Title VII cases help demonstrate the proper evidentiary use of speech, any
First Amendment question raised by the use of this evidence is not identical to that posed in
§ 8(a)(3) cases. Racial slurs, for example, unlike antiunion campaign speech, arguably may
be entitled to little or no First Amendment protection. See Charles Lawrence, fHe Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke LJ. 431; Mar 1. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320
(1989); Smolla, supra note 175. But see Nadine Strassen, Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990 DuKE L.. 484; Toni Massero, Equality and Freedom of
Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemna, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 218 (1991).
Also, the governmental interest in combatting race or sex discrimination should be
viewed as more compelling than discrimination on the basis of union activities. New Negro
Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938); See William B. Gould, The
Supreme Court and Employment Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat and
Congressional Response, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1485, 1502 (1990). But see Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 254 (1989).194 See sources cited supra note 193.
195 See Note, supra note 156 at 895 ("If the only evidence of a defendant's specific
intent is constitutionally protected speech, the danger is too great that an individual will be
punished merely for his ideas and his association with a controversial group.").
196 See supra notes 161-78 and accompanying text.
19 7 As Professor Ely has observed, in a somewhat analogous context, the absence of a
"bright line" test is not overly problematic: "[A]t least the question is intelligible, and it
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in many cases. But this determination should occur with full recognition of the
constitutional interests present and of the competing difficulties inherent in
establishing motive.198
Analysis of the Holo-Krome case helps flesh out this standard. In Holo-
Krome v. NLRB, protected speech opposing unionization originally was relied
upon by the Board in finding that an employer's refusal to hire union
supporters was motivated by antiunion animus. But the protected speech was
only a small part of the overall evidence of unlawful motive. Other evidence
supporting the finding of unlawful motive included the employer's knowledge
of the employees' active role in the union campaign, unprotected employer
speech, inconsistent employer responses to the employees' requests to return to
work, and the employer's failure to provide a credible explanation for its
acts. 199 Thus, the Board acted properly when it used the protected speech as
circumstantial evidence of unlawful motive. The court's decision mandating
exclusion of the evidence was erroneous.
On remand, the Board reaffirmed its finding of discrimination after
excluding the protected speech from consideration,2°° but the Second Circuit
denied enforcement.201 The court acknowledged the employer's conduct could
"be interpreted either as lawful or unlawful," but it refused to permit the Board
to assess that conduct against the employer's opposition to unionization. 20 2
Accordingly, without the antiunion speech to place the employer's actions in
perspective, it found the evidence insufficient to establish a prima facie
violation of the Act.
The court's decision demonstrates the Board's need to rely on protected
speech in determining unlawful motive.203 The antiunion backdrop against
does not seem much harder than others courts answer in this and other contexts." Ely,
supra note 152, at 1490.
198 In his article criticizing § 8(c), which he read literally to exclude all evidentiary use
of protected speech, Professor Cox observed that the evil of the Board's undue reliance on
protected speech could be better prevented by careful judicial review to ensure there was
substantial evidence on the record as a whole of unlawful motive. Cox, supra note 1, at 20.
In fact, the Board has found this is what Congress intended, and, as this article notes,
what the First Amendment demands. The speech may be used as evidence, but the Board
and judiciary must ensure that the evidence as a whole supports a finding of unlawful
motive.
199 907 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1990).
2 00 Holo-Krome, 302 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1991).
201 Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB, 947 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1991).
202 Id. at 592.
203 See NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 431 (2d Cir. 1951),
remanded, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (quoted in Smith's Transfer Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 143, 164
(1966)), discussing the difficulties involved in establishing motive.
See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985), in which the Court refused to find
a First Amendment violation, even when no important government interest would be
implicated in the particular case at hand, based on the need for a general rule.
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which transfer requests are refused or similarly situated employees are treated
differently, or the strength of the proferred reason for a discharge, assist the
Board in determining what motives in fact were present in a particular case.204
As the balancing in the previous section demonstrates, the Board can use this
protected speech to assist it in placing conduct in perspective, in helping it to
determine whether, in view of the totality of the circumstances, conduct was
unlawful. 205 The Holo-Krome court should have permitted consideration of the
protected speech, which was used only as a backdrop against which to assess
other evidence of motive.
In contrast, Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB illustrates the Board's improper
use of protected speech. 206 Missing from the record was any proof of a causal
connection between the employer's antiunion stance and the discharges. 207
Overturning the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(3) violation, the court refused
to permit the Board to find unlawful motive "based solely on the general bias
or anti-union attitude of the employer." 20 8 Similarly, in NLRB v. Eastern
Smelting & Refining Corp.,209 the court recognized that both section 8(c) and
the First Amendment preclude the Board from finding a discharge unlawfully
motivated simply because the employer had opposed unionization. 210 The court
204 See supra notes 82, 85 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 161-78 and accompanying text.
206 587 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1979).
207 Id. at 742; ("[The fact that anti-union animus existed on the part of the employer
does not make the discharge unlawful unless the General Counsel proves a causal
connection between the anti-union attitude of the employer and the discharge.")
208 Id. at 744. The animus in F/orida Steel was reflected through both protected and
unprotected, i.e., coercive, speech. The Board's reliance on coercive speech as exclusive
proof of unlawful motive, while improper as a matter of law because the speech
demonstrated no causal connection with the employment decision, poses no First
Amendment problem, because the speech is unprotected. See, e.g., Stokely-Van Camp v.
NLRB, 722 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1983) (because evidence of animus was solely speech,
court had to determine whether protected or unprotected; if unprotected, the speech could
be relied upon without consideration of § 8(c) or First Amendment); J.P. Stevens & Co. v.
NLRB, 638 F.2d 676, 680 (4th Cir. 1980) (company's "unrivaled willingness to violate the
law in the past" is material to the question of wrongful motive).
209 598 F.2d 666 (1st Cir. 1979).
2 10 Id. at 670. The court carefully scrutinized the record to ensure the protected speech
had not played a primary role in the Board's determination, criticizing the Board for too
often using the protected speech as a prism through which actions are viewed. As the court
stated, "[o]nce it is concluded that an employer is opposed to unions, everything fits,"
leading the Board, in the court's eyes, to ignore or to discredit relevant evidence. Id. at 676
n.21.
This searching inquiry of the record to ensure a case is not based solely or primarily on
protected speech is what is required by § 8(c) and the First Amendment.
In Holo-Krome II, there is a suggestion the court similarly was faulting the Board for
over-reliance on protected speech. If that had been what the Board had done, refusing
enforcement of the Board's order would have been proper. But in Holo-Krome, the court
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reprimanded the Board for viewing all evidence against an employer once it
concludes the employer opposes unions, because such an approach gives undue
prominence to the lawful speech. Yet in neither of these cases did the courts
fault the Board for considering the speech.211 They instead recognized that the
Board could not point to the protected speech as carrying its burden of proof.
More troubling are so-called "mixed motive" cases. When the Board finds
an employer had two or more motives for a particular act, only one of which is
unlawful, there is not automatically an unfair labor practice. 212 Instead, the
employer bears the burden of proving he would have reached the same decision
anyway, had he not had an unlawful motive.213 If the Board uses protected
speech exclusively or primarily to conclude one of the motives was unlawful,
thereby shifting the burden of proof to the employer, have the employer's First
Amendment rights been infringed?214
refused to allow the Board to give any consideration to the protected speech. Moreover,
there was considerable evidence of animus apart from the protected speech. See Holo-
Krome, 302 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1991). The court denied enforcement based on its view that
the Board had continued, despite the court's instructions to the contrary, to take the
protected speech into account. 947 F.2d 588 (1991).
211 The courts appeared to acknowledge the Board's right to take the employers' anti-
union stance into account; they simply faulted the Board for overweighting it. Thus, Holo-
Krome v. NLRB's reliance on these cases for the proposition that § 8(c) demands wholesale
exclusion of protected speech, see 907 F.2d 1343, 1345 (2d Cir. 1990), is misplaced.2 12 NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983); Wright Line,
251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enfd, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989
(1982). Wright Line was derived from the Supreme Court's opinion in Mt. Healthy v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), in which the Court applied a burden shifting technique to a
case involving alleged violation of First Amendment rights. Mr. Doyle, a high school
teacher, was fired for a number of reasons, one of which was his protected activity. The
lower court determined that because his protected conduct had played a part in his
discharge, Mr. Doyle must prevail. Reasoning that Mr. Doyle should not be better off for
exercising his First Amendment rights than he would have been had he remained silent, the
Court remanded the case to give the school board the opportunity to prove it would have
fired Mr. Doyle even had he not engaged in protected conduct.
More recently the Court followed Mt. Healthy and Transportation Management in
construing Title VII, applying the same burden shifting devices to a claim of sex
discrimination. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
213 See sources cited supra note 212.
214 Section 8(a)(3) is violated even if the anti-union motive is not the sole basis for the
employer's action, so long as it is a motivating factor. See NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399-400 (1983). The General Counsel, however,
retains the burden of proving that the antiunion animus was a motivating factor. Id. at 400.
The question presented here is whether that burden may be carried exclusively or primarily
by protected speech.
This issue has arisen infrequently because of the Board's recognition that protected
speech can play only a background role in proving unlawful motive. See supra notes 80-84
and accompanying text; see also Edwards, supra note 2, at 7, noting the Board's reluctance
to regard speech as a burden-shifting technique.
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In these cases, the Board is not imposing liability on the employer based on
the protected speech but is requiring the employer to prove what in effect is an
affirmative defense. 215 If the employer can prove he would have taken the same
action even if no unlawful motive had been present, the employer escapes
liability.216 But when this burden is imposed on the employer simply because
he engaged in protected speech, the First Amendment is violated.
The placement of the burden of proof frequently is outcome
determinative. 217 In NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., the Supreme
Court justified the Board's shifting of the burden of persuasion to the employer
in "mixed motive" cases because in those cases,
the employer is a wrongdoer, he has acted out of a motive that is declared
illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of
legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the
risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own
wrongdoing. 218
However, the Supreme Court may have increased the temptation for the Board to rely
more heavily on protected speech. In her concurrence in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989), Justice O'Connor suggested it was only "direct evidence" that could
justify shifting onto the employer the burden of proof. Id. at 276-77. In the aftermath of
Price Waterhouse, at least in the Title VII context, heavier reliance has been placed on
employer speech, whether or not it may properly be characterized as direct. See e.g.,
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990); Edwards, supra note 2, at 26.
The Board, of course, is constrained by § 8(c) from giving undue weight to protected
speech. Nor is the Price Waterhouse decision binding on the Board. But Price Waterhouse's
emphasis on "speech" as evidence may influence the Board's treatment of speech in the
future, thus highlighting the need for a full understanding of the role protected employer
speech may permissibly play in § 8(a)(3) cases.
215 NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400-01 (1983). As
the Court noted, an employer commits no violation of the NLRA if any animus it may have
does not contribute to a discharge. Id. at 398. At the same time, a discharge motivated in
part by antiunion animus may be held unlawful. Id. The Board's Wright Line approach does
not alter the elements of the offense but rather shifts the burden of proof. Once the General
Counsel proves animus played a part in the discharge, he does not have to go further and
prove the action would not have been taken but for the antiunion animus. Rather, the
burden of production and proof shifts to the employer to prove it would have made the
same decision anyway.
216 The Court "assumed" the Board could have held the NLRA is violated whenever
antiunion animus plays a motivating part in a discharge, without regard to whether the
action would have been taken anyway, or could have construed the statute to require the
General Counsel to prove the discharge would not have taken place independent of the
protected conduct. Id. at 401-02. But it upheld the Board's Wright Line approach as a "not
impermissible construction of the Act." Id. at 402.
217 Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986); New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958);
Behring Int'l v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984).
218 462 U.S. at 403.
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The Court thus upheld the shifting of the burden of proof based on its view
that an employer whose actions are motivated even in part by unlawful reasons
has done something wrong. When the basis for a finding of "wrongdoing,"
however, is protected speech, the employer has been saddled with both a
legally imposed stigma and an evidentiary burden he would not have borne had
he not exercised his First Amendment rights. Because this burden is substantial
enough to "chill" an employer's speech, it cannot be shifted to the employer
simply because of the protected speech. 219
On a number of occasions, in the First Amendment context, the Supreme
Court has recognized that placement of burdens of proof can impermissibly
chill First Amendment rights. 220 In Speiser v. Randall, the Court found
unconstitutional a requirement that a taxpayer who refused to sign an oath bore
the burden of proving his eligibility for a tax exemption, when those taxpayers
signing the oath were presumed eligible for the exemption. 221 As the Court
explained:
In all kinds of litigation it is plain that where the burden of proof lies may be
decisive of the outcome. The man who knows that he must bring forth proof
and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far
wider of the unlawful zone than if the state must bear these burdens .... It
can only result in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free.
2 2 2
Similarly, in New York Tunes v. Sullivan, the Court rejected a rule that
would require a defendant accused of libeling a public figure to prove the truth
of his speech. 223 The Court recognized that placing the burden of proof on
defendants may deter even true criticism of public officials "because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so." 224
This chilling effect was held inconsistent with the First Amendment.225
The same may be said of a rule that switches to an employer the burden of
proving the lawfulness of his employment actions when he chooses to engage
219 "Chilling means the inhibition of socially useful activities on account of the actor's
fear of possible adverse consequences.... In the First Amendment area of freedom of
expression it usually refers to self-censorship, that is, needless self-repression of
expression." Note, infra note 220, at 1465 n.39. This Note recognizes, in a related context,
that a shift in the burden of persuasion can "chill" protected speech. Id. at 1469, 1475.
220 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959); Note, 2itle VI and
Congressional Employees: The 'Odlling Effect' and the Speech and Debate Clause, 90
YALE L.. 1458, 1475-80 (1981); see also cases cited supra note 217.
221 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
222 Id. at 525-26; see also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959).
223 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
224 Id.
225 Id.; see Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
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in protected speech. 226 An employer forced to shoulder the burden of proving
the lawfulness of its conduct, a burden the Court has acknowledged will often
be a difficult one to meet, 227 may well deter employers from speaking, whether
or not they intended to act out of animus. Doubts over the ability to prove the
lawfulness of their conduct and fears of the expense of having to do so may
lead employers to censor themselves by refraining from opposing
unionization. 228
In summary, the role protected speech is permitted to play in unfair labor
practice proceedings will determine how great a chilling effect is present. When
protected speech is used only as circumstantial or background evidence to assist
the trier of fact in determining motive, an employer has little to fear. Unless
there is other evidence to support the claim of unlawful motive, the employer
will not be found guilty of an unfair labor practice.229 But were the Board
permitted to allow protected speech to take center stage, either in finding a
section 8(a)(3) violation or in placing the burden of proof on an employer, an
employer may well be deterred from speaking out.230
When the protected speech is the only evidence or the principal evidence of
unlawful motive, the Board is doing covertly what Virginia Electric and Gissel
held cannot be done overtly-it is penalizing an employer for engaging in
protected speech. 231 Moreover, because protected speech is not highly
probative evidence that unlawful discrimination occurred, there is no
226 See Note, supra note 220, at 1469-81. In that Note, the author questions whether
applying Title VII to congressional employees would conflict with the speech and debate
clause and urges an adjustment of evidentiary requirements to guard against chilling
protected speech. Specifically, the Note urges placing on plaintiff the burden of proving
intentional discrimination by clear and convincing evidence.
The Note accepts as a given that speech protected by the speech and debate clause
could not be used to show intent, relying on United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.2 27 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248-50, 252 (1989).
228 See sources cited supra note 217.
229 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
230 Often, no concrete evidence of a chilling effect may be found because such
evidence frequently is difficult, if not impossible, to come by.
Chilling effect is, by its very nature, difficult to establish in concrete and
quantitative terms; the absence of any direct actions against individuals assertedly
subject to a chill can be viewed as much as proof of the success of the chill as of
evidence of the absence of any need for concern.
Community-Service Broadcasting, Etc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see
Note, supra note 220, at 1470.
231 See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
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compelling governmental interest in permitting the Board to base its case on the
protected speech.23 2
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1947, Congress was cognizant of the First Amendment problems in
using protected speech to establish unlawful conduct. It responded by drafting a
statute that reasonably may be read as coinciding with the First Amendment's
guarantees, assuring employers of congressional intent to preserve, not expand
or infringe upon, First Amendment rights.23 3
Accordingly, courts err when they read section 8(c) to prohibit any reliance
on protected speech to establish unlawful motive. Section 8(c) may permissibly
be read only to preclude the Board from finding an employer acted for a
discriminatory reason "simply because" of his protected speech.
Whether section 8(c)'s protections of speech are constitutionally compelled
raises complex questions of when speech may be used to establish unlawful
action. Certainly, no wholesale exclusion of all speech is demanded by the First
Amendment. Rather, the evidentiary role speech is assigned to play must be
considered in determining whether a First Amendment problem exists in using
speech as evidence.
When protected speech is used as background evidence to determine
motive, there is no direct abridgement of speech. Moreover, under the lenient
balancing process applied to indirect abridgement, the evidentiary use of the
speech is not barred by the First Amendment.
When the protected speech, however, becomes the exclusive or primary
evidence of unlawful motive, the abridgement is direct. Because it serves no
compelling governmental interest, this evidentiary use of the speech is
unconstitutional. Alternatively, because primary reliance on protected speech
inhibits lawful expression in a manner more restrictive than necessary to serve
the government' interest in determining unlawful motive, the abridgement,
even if viewed as indirect, violates the First Amendment.
232 As set forth previously, using protected speech as the exclusive or primary proof of
an unfair labor practice and imposing liability is a direct abridgement of speech subject to
Track One analysis. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text. When the Board uses
the speech merely to shift the burden of proof, the restraint also is direct. Employers who
remained silent or who spoke in favor of unions do not bear the burden of proving they
acted lawfully; employers who oppose unions must shoulder the risk and expense of
litigation. Because the burden only shifts based on the content of the employer's speech, the
restraint is direct. See supra notes 212-19 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 98-140 and accompanying text.
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